Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company v. 51- Spr- L.L.C : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company v. 51-
Spr- L.L.C : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Stephen Marshall; Erik A. Olson; Durham Jones and Pinegar; Attorneys for Defendant.
Mark L. Pouslen; Bret W. Reich; Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle and Poulsen; Attorneys for plaintiff.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Paulsen Construction Company v. 51- Spr- L.L.C, No. 20040507 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5054
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
51-SPR-L.L.C, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
51-SPR-L.L.C. 
Appellate Case No. 20040507-CA 
(Trial Court Civil No. 010405059) 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
HONORABLE GARY D. STOTT AND ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, 
DISTRICT JUDGES 
R. Stephen Marshall (2097) 
Erik A. Olson (8479) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark L. Poulsen 
Bret W. Reich 
NELSON SNUFFER DAHLE & POULSEN 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Attorneys for Ellsworth Paulsen 
Construction Company 
Attorneys for 51-SPR-L.L.C. 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JAN 2 1 2005 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
51-SPR-L.L.C, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
51-SPR-L.L.C. 
Appellate Case No. 20040507-CA 
(Trial Court Civil No. 010405059) 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
HONORABLE GARY D. STOTT AND ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, 
DISTRICT JUDGES 
R. Stephen Marshall (2097) 
Erik A. Olson (8479) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark L. Poulsen Attorneys for 51-SPR-L.L.C. 
Bret W. Reich 
NELSON SNUFFER DAHLE & POULSEN 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Attorneys for Ellsworth Paulsen 
Construction Company 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 4 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 6 
EPCO's Dealings with Hatch - The Proposed Williams Property 
Development 6 
Agreements for the Development of 51-SPR's Property 7 
Central Bank's Payments and EPCO's Lien Waivers 8 
Work Performed on the Buildings After Draw Request Dates 9 
Completion of the Buildings 10 
Mechanics' Liens on the Property 11 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 12 
ARGUMENT 13 
I. THERE WAS NO JOINT VENTURE BETWEEN 51 -SPR AND 
BROADSTONE AND HATCH 13 
A. By Shifting the Duty to Share Losses to Broadstone, Addendum No. 
2 Expressly Precludes Any Finding of Joint Venture 13 
B. At Minimum, Triable Issues Existed Regarding Whether 51-SPR 
Agreed to Share Losses with Broadstone 15 
II. DISPUTED FACTS PRECLUDED ENTRY OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON THE TIMELINESS OF EPCO'S MECHANICS' 
LIENS 16 
A. The Parties Disputed the Final Completion Date of the Buildings 17 
I 
1. The Parties Disputed the Date Building I Work Was 
Completed 18 
2. The Parties Disputed the Date Building II Work Was 
Completed 19 
B. The Parties Disputed the Date That Work Was Accepted 21 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE LIEN WAIVERS EVEN AFTER CORRECTLY FINDING 
THE LIEN WAIVERS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE 23 
A. The Trial Court Should Have Applied the Waiver Provisions to 
EPCO's Mechanics' Lien Claim 23 
1. Uncontroverted Evidence Established That the Value of 
EPCO's Work on Building I After the Draw Date Was 
$19,590.16 25 
2. Uncontroverted Evidence Established That the Value of 
EPCO's Work on Building II After the Draw Date Was 
$208,751.59 26 
3. Judgment on EPCO's Mechanics' Lien Claims Should Not 
Have Exceeded the Uncontroverted Value of Work That Was 
Not Waived 27 
4. The Mechanics' Lien Claims Should Also Be Reduced to the 
Extent They Include Work Performed by EPCO's 
Subcontractors, Whom 51-SPR Has Paid 28 
B. The Trial Court Erred When It Refused to Enforce the Plain, 
Unambiguous Indemnity Provision of the Lien Waivers Against 
EPCO 29 
C. The Trial Court Erred When It Refused to Enforce Against EPCO 
the Guaranty and Warranty Language in the Lien Waivers 32 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD EPCO LIABLE FOR 
FILING AN ABUSIVE LIEN OF $78,000 FOR WORK PERFORMED 
ON THE WILLIAMS PROPERTY 33 
A. EPCO Could Not Lien the Property for the $78,000 Paid to Vintage 34 
ii 
B. The Trial Court Erred by Failing to Conclude That by Claiming a 
Lien on 51-SPR's Property for the $78,000 Paid to Vintage, EPCO Is 
Liable Under 38-1-25 35 
C. The Findings Relied on by the Trial Court in Denying the Abusive 
Lien Claim with Respect to the $78,000 Claim Were Clearly 
Erroneous and Immaterial 37 
1. The Findings That Hatch Instructed Ellsworth to File the 
Mechanics' Lien Including the $78,000 Is Clearly Erroneous 
(Findings 23 and 25) 38 
2. The Findings Regarding EPCO's "Good Faith" in Filing the 
Lien Are Clearly Erroneous and Immaterial (Findings 23 and 
25) 39 
3. The Finding That EPCO Lacked Intent Is Clearly Erroneous 
and Immaterial (Findings 24 and 25) 40 
4. The Trial Court Clearly Erred in Finding That Hatch Owned 
the Property (Findings 2 and 25) 43 
5. The Trial Court Clearly Erred in Finding That the $78,000 
Was Paid to "Hatch and Broadstone" (Finding 22) 43 
6. The Trial Court Clearly Erred in Finding That Ellsworth 
Assumed the $78,000 Was "Possibly for Building II" and 
That the Rendering Included Buildings I and II (Finding No. 
2) 44 
V. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO EPCO SHOULD BE 
REVERSED 45 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Attorney Fees for 
Noncompensable Claims 45 
B. The $78,000 Abusive Lien Bars Any Fee Award to EPCO 48 
C. After the Appeal, Remand Will Be Necessary to Reassess Whether 
51-SPR or EPCO is the Prevailing Party 48 
CONCLUSION 49 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const., 1999 UT App 87, 977 
P.2d 518 passim 
A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, 94 P.3d 270... 4, 35, 37, 49 
Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993) 3 
American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Comm. Corp., 939 P.2d 185 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) 4,48 
Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 1974) 1, 13, 14, 16 
Betenson v. Call Auto & Equip. Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684 (Utah 1982) 1, 13, 14, 16 
Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge # 1743, B.P.O.E., 854 P.2d 513 (Utah 1993) 42 
Broadwater v. Old Rep. Sur., 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993) 30 
Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 978 P.2d 470 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 4, 46 
Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941 (Utah 1996) 17 
Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989) 46 
Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951 (Utah 1978) 30 
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266 (Utah 1992) 3, 46 
First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Gillman, 158 B.R. 498 (D. Utah 1993) 13 
Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998) 46 
Gate City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dalton, 808 P.2d 1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 30 
Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs., 827 P.2d 963 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) 2, 17 
Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs., 881 P.2d 929 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) 2, 22 
Jaeger v. West. Rivers Fly Fisher, 855 F. Supp. 1217 (D. Utah 1994) 16 
iv 
Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10, 977 P.2d 474 24 
Johanson Bros. Builders v. Board of Review, 222 P.2d 563, 567 (Utah 1950) 13 
Neiderhauser Builders and Development Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) 2,23,24 
Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, 994 P.2d 193 31 
Pochynok v. Smedsrud, 2003 UT App 375, 80 P.3d 563 passim 
Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1987) 16 
Rossberg v. Holesapple, 260 P.2d 563, 123 Utah 544 (1953) 40 
State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 42 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880 (Utah 1993) 2, 3 
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, 54 P.3d 1054 1, 2 
Willard Pease Oil and Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil and Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995).. 16 
Zions First National Bank v. Carlson, 464 P.2d 387, 388 (Utah 1970) 34 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-5(10) (2001) 4, 47 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1(7) (2001) 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(3) (2001) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (2001) passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7(1) (2001) 19 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (2001) 3, 48, 49 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25 (2001) passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3.1 (2002) 1, 4, 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-4 (2002) 1, 4, 14, 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002) 1 
v 
Rules 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) 17 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) 38 
VI 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court err in determining on summary judgment that a 
joint venture was created between Appellant 51-SPR-L.L.C. ("51-SPR") and Guy Hatch 
and Broadstone Investments, LC, in developing the Northshore Office Buildings when 
51-SPR acted as a mere investor, without any duty to share in losses? 
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-1-3.1, -4 (2002); Bassett v. Baker, 
530 P.2d 1 (Utah 1974); Betenson v. Call Auto & Equip. Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1982). 
Standard of Review: Summary judgment is a question of law to be reviewed for 
correctness, affording no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Waddoups v. 
Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, f^ 21, 54 P.3d 1054. This issue was preserved in 
51-SPR's memoranda [R.966-68, 2348-54] and at oral argument [Tr. 8463 at 17-34].1 
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court err in determining on summary judgment that the 
mechanics' liens of Appellee Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company ("EPCO") 
against 51-SPR's buildings were timely when disputed facts existed as to (i) the dates on 
Citations to the record within this brief are as follows: (1) references to record 
pages are preceded by "R."; (2) portions of the ten transcript volumes are referred to as 
"Tr." followed by the record number (e.g., 8459) and the page; and (3) trial exhibits are 
cited as "PI. Ex." or "Def. Ex." All relevant orders are attached as Addenda, which are 
cited with an "Add." reference. 
1 
which work on the buildings was completed, and (ii) when the owner accepted EPCO's 
work as complete? 
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. §§38-1-3, -7(1 )(b) (2001); Interiors 
Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs., 881 P.2d 929, (Utah Ct. App. 
1994); Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs., 827 P.2d 963 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Standard of Review: Summary judgment is a question of law to be reviewed for 
correctness, affording no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Waddoups, 
2002 UT 69 at |^ 21. This issue was preserved in 51-SPR's memoranda [R.961-63, 
3220-23, 4383-88, 5951-55, 6155-59] and at oral argument. [Tr. 8464 at 78-90]. 
Issue No. 3: Did the trial court err in refusing to apply the binding, enforceable 
lien waivers that EPCO executed during the construction of the buildings? Subsumed in 
this issue are three discrete subissues: whether, based on the lien waivers, the trial court 
erred in (a) failing to reduce the value of EPCO's mechanics' lien claim; (b) refusing to 
require EPCO to indemnify 51-SPR against subcontract claims; and (c) refusing to find a 
breach of EPCO's warranty and guaranty that it had paid subcontractors. 
Determinative Law: Neiderhauser Builders and Development Corp. v. Campbell, 
824 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Standard of Review: This issue presents pure questions of law, which the Court 
reviews for correctness. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 
880, 885 (Utah 1993). This issue was preserved in 51-SPR's memoranda [R.3217-18, 
2 
3223-26, 4707-22, 7746-51], at oral argument [Tr. 8459 at 117-19; 8464 at 7-16, 4 9 -
57; 8470 at 20-23; 8471 at 44-46], and at trial [R.7779-84; Tr. 8468 at 652-63], 
Issue No. 4: Did the trial court err in concluding that EPCO did not violate the 
abusive lien statute when it filed a lien on 51-SPR's property for $78,000 it allegedly paid 
to Hatch's company for work performed on the Williams Property, which provided no 
benefit whatsoever to 51-SPR's Northshore property? 
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-3, -25 (2001). 
Standard of Review: This issue presents questions of law and fact. The Court 
reviews factual determinations for clear error, Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 
1286 (Utah 1993), and questions of law for correctness. United Park City Mines Co., 870 
P.2d at 885. This issue was preserved in 51-SPR's memoranda [R.3219-20, 3321-22, 
4593, 4706-07], at oral argument [Tr. 8459 at 82-83, 100-04; 8470 at 16-20], and at trial 
[R.7784-86; Tr. 8468 at 644-48]. 
Issue No. 5: Did the trial court err when it awarded to EPCO all of its attorney 
fees when EPCO failed to differentiate between fees incurred in prosecuting compensable 
and noncompensable claims? Moreover, did the trial court err in awarding attorney fees 
to EPCO when EPCO filed an abusive lien, and when 51-SPR should have prevailed on 
the other issues addressed by this appeal? 
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (2001); Pochynok v. Smedsrud, 
2003 UT App 375, 80 P.3d 563; A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen 
Const., 1999 UT App 87, 977 P.2d 518; Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266 
(Utah 1992); Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App 109, 978 P.2d 470 (Utah 
3 
Ct. App. 1999); American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Comm. Corp., 939 P.2d 185 
(UtahCt.App. 1997). 
Standard of Review: An attorney fee decision that involves questions of law is 
reviewed for correctness. A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, 
K 6, 94 P.3d 270. This issue was preserved in 51-SPR's memoranda [R.4379-80, 8133-
36, 8316] and at trial [R.7778-79, 7773-74; Tr. 8468 at 48-51, 64-66, 73-75]. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions, which are of central importance to the appeal, 
are set forth in their entirety in Addendum A: 
1. Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-3, -7, -18, -25 (2001) (mechanics' lien act) 
2. Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-1-3.1(1), -4(2) (2002) (partnership act) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
EPCO, along with four of its subcontractors, Westwood Mill & Cabinet 
("Westwood"), Hansen All Seasons Insulation ("Hansen"), Allstate Electric ("Allstate") 
and Halverson Mechanical ("Halverson"), filed claims to foreclose their respective 
mechanics' liens against 51-SPR's Northshore property. EPCO also brought claims 
against Guy Hatch ("Hatch") and Broadstone Investments, L.C., ("Broadstone") for 
failing to pay amounts due under the two construction contracts and for failing to obtain a 
payment bond. [R.2740, 2745^-6.] EPCO brought the same claims against 51-SPR, 
alleging that 51-SPR was Hatch and Broadstone's joint venturer. [Id.] 
4 
5 .v*'i\ :.icd a separate a^ih.i. .*. . a was consolidated ii lto the present suit. 
[R.564 ; ; . ' ' * • • . • - . , « ^»j;> i
 )l: , )(1 jg] I( clain 1S . igainst EPCO f< >r 
inchidiim in its lien a claim lor repayment of $7X,000 that EPCO had paid for work that 
benefited the V V illiai i is I : i li operty and i ic >t 51 SI } R's property. [R .2391 93, 3321 22.] 51 
SI *.R d sfei ided agaii ist tl ic si ill: coi iti actoi s' claii i is ai id I lltii i iatel> settled • ' itl i • : a :1 i :: i 
them. [ D e f . E x s . 3 0 , 3 1 , 6 6 . ] 
The trial court made a number of rulings before trial on various cross-motions for 
s 
Hatch and Broadstone, and tlms shared liability under Broadstone 's construction 
contracts with EPCO. Second, the trial court held that E P C O ' s mechanics ' lien was 
tii nel}' ' 1 1 lii ci, tl le ti ial coi n t f oi ind tl tat tl ic liei i w aivers si pice, .., i . n 
coi isideration foi ' coi isti i lctioi i loai I payi i ici its it received : • • "• v alid an: id 
enforceable, and cu: off an\ hen rights ihroueh the dale of each draw request tha: 
predicated ii ic . . .^^ • i-». - ^ i --^i •, omt iu lu . m.i- u .. in.ni in<; v n force any other 
language p*5 >' • i • * -.. - - > R 
*  Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment Against 51-SPR on Issue of l . iabni iy 
as Joint Venturer With and Partner of Broadstone at 12 (Jan. 4. 2003) ("Joint Vcn?-;-
Order") (Addendi nn B). 
~'Order d ra in ing HPCO's Mono i u> Recon-nlc> on :i,v. I unehness of the 
Mechanics ' Liens at 2 i Jul\ l;. ?00.\) n icn Timelines < )i-i.-i ) (Addendum E). 
Findings and i -..-.,..
 4. . J n n o f , "V->; • . * (\ , i . I U H I J I . . -
5 
against subcontractor claims and EPCO's guaranty that its subcontractors had been paid.5 
Fifth, the trial court dismissed EPCO's claim that 51-SPR failed to obtain a payment 
bond.6 
After a three-day bench trial, the trial court denied 51-SPR's abusive lien claim, 
holding that EPCO had acted in good faith in including the $78,000 in its lien claim. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 10-11 ffif 25-26 (May 18, 2004) (Addendum 
I). Pursuant to its prior joint venture ruling, the trial court awarded damages against 51-
SPR on EPCO's breach of contract claim. fcL at 9 t 1 20-21. Then, rather than apply the 
lien waivers to reduce EPCO's damages, the trial court entered judgment on EPCO's lien 
foreclosure claim in the same amount. Id at 19 f^ 1. The trial court found EPCO to be 
the prevailing party under the mechanics' lien statute, and awarded attorney fees for all of 
EPCO's various claims. Id at 16-17 If 44; 17-18 ffif 4 5 ^ 7 . 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
EPCO's Dealings with Hatch - The Proposed Williams Property Development 
Broadstone and Hatch developed a project in Utah County known as Broadstone 
Square. [Tr. 8466 at 80-81, 87-88.] EPCO served as Hatch's general contractor on the 
project. [Id.] In August 1999, in the course of that development, EPCO's president, 
Richard Ellsworth ("Ellsworth") recommended that Hatch look at developing a parcel 
^ Order Granting EPCO's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Indemnities at 2 
(Dec. 31, 2003) ("Indemnity Order") (attached as Addendum G). 
6
 Order on EPCO's Failure to Obtain a Bond Claim at 2 (Feb. 9, 2004) 
(Addendum H). 
6 
owned, by a Mr, Williams (tl le "Willi mis Proper! y"\ which neighbored EPCO's 
Anu-i ;can i . .. : i ] 
Hatch later came to EPCO's office with a rendering he had obtained from Hubble 
Engineering ("Hubble") of proposed office buildings on the Williams Property, and 
requested tl lat EI }CO pay $ 78,000 foi de\ el.opm.ent w,-,. done on tlu ...i ru perly. 
[Id
 :1 it 3 1 60 61, 6.5, 73 74 ; [>. f Ex 6.2 ] I h it< ::1 u igi < * : it! i„ n 1 i< : w ( >i i.l,i Igi ^ t :: EI >CO ; i„ 
change order on the first building constructed on the Williams Property in exchange for 
the payment, [Tr 8466 at 62, 67, 81.] Ellsworth testified at u .n mai JK- assumed that the 
$78,000 < > i ui i„I,i fi it i . . . . • 
65, 66, 78.] EPCO received u ui\[ l.om v intage Construction, Hatch* *> company, lui ihe 
$78,000, and paid the invoice u ith a cheek In Vintage. [Id. at 64; Def. Ex. 28.] No 
project \ ^ h i : \ f . ,
 ; ] 
Agreeim-m^ im tin in ^ eiopmeiti < = l Sl-SPR's V\ opi \\\ 
Several months later, I hitch solicited 5 1 -SPK to m\ est $2.9 million in a real estate 
development known a -»Jinshore on anon*c, Aineiican l -ik i ^ i a i niie rroperiv *o 
\ ^I'K .i«Miii ^ | • » !-a . • - : • '' ».R ct itei ed intc ai I 
agreement known as "Addendum No. .\" under w !ach 1 latch's company would construct 
three commerce . . • ;n r^ on tlic Ptoperty (to l>e known as "Bunding h i I. ••• 
e(« i | I'll HI I | i NddrmliH" U« y " all n lied a VUentfiiii. K i 
Addenduni No. 2 expressly required Broadsione and Hatch to bear the nsk of any 
losses from the purchase and development of the Property, and expressly rehe\ ed 51 
; 
were responsible for purchasing the Property, obtaining construction financing, hiring a 
general contractor, supervising construction, leasing the buildings, managing the 
Property, and all other costs associated with the project. [R.1001 Tf 6.] 51-SPR and 
Broadstone would hold the Property as tenants-in-common. [Add. K; R.1001 j^ 8.] 
However, with the exception of one day on which title to the Property was vested in 
Broadstone so it could secure construction financing, 51-SPR owned the Property at all 
relevant times. [Tr. 8467 at 379-80.] 
Broadstone entered into two construction agreements with EPCO ("Building I 
Contract" and "Building II Contract") in March and August 2000, respectively, under 
which EPCO agreed to act as general contractor in the construction of two buildings on 
the Property ("Building I" and "Building II"). [Def. Exs. 3, 4.] To fund the construction, 
Broadstone entered into two separate loan agreements with Central Bank roughly 
equivalent to the amounts of the two construction contracts. Hatch and Dan Parkinson (a 
co-member of Broadstone) guaranteed the loans. [Def. Exs. 1, 2; Tr. 8467 at 439-40.] 
Central Bank's Payments and EPCO's Lien Waivers 
During construction of each Building, EPCO prepared monthly payment 
applications for Central Bank, each of which set forth the value of work performed 
during that month and included the following signed certification: 
The undersigned Contractor certifies that to the best of the Contractor's 
knowledge, information and belief, the Work covered by this Application 
for Payment has been completed in accordance with the Contract 
Documents . . . . 
8 
[Def. Exs, 8, 9; Tr, 8467 at 464-65.] Throughout construction, EPCO also signed Central 
Bai il :'s foi i i I rem lests for di aw s c : t i tl ic coi isti i I :tioi i. I :)aif i f'i u: i :is | Dei ' Exs 6. / ; I it 8 166 
at I u
 A 04, I r. b4o7 ai 441 42.j Each draw request sought checks for EPCO, its 
subcontractors, or Hatch-related entities, and contained the following certification: 
We certify and represent mat an laoor ana materials for which these bills 
are prestvMed have been usH i" iU'^ -*• v^-tv" <;-^ -*rthis referenced unit 
[Def. Exs. 6, 7, It . 8466 at 1 u I U-i, i-4o; 11. 8407 at 4-1 * 4^.j froni the respective 
construction loan funds, Central Bank issued checks as listed on the draw requests signed 
by i i « • . ut- . . . . . . iw reone 
were dated Apin 1 i and June 25, 2uui, lespecim Def. h\&. u , iu, n . 6 4 o 7 a i ::% 
44.1 Each check con ta ined a pmvis io i i tllat, by negot ia t i i ig the c h e c k , the p a y e e (1) 
w a i v e d .• , .. . .gins as u; : ., *uiw ..; ;11V v;* a w reques t , (2) w a r r a n t e e u.^i Uie p a y e e had 
r - • • - : • • - . • 
property against losses incurred liom claims by suppliers of laboi oi materials. <VA 
representative Central Rank hen waiver is attached as Addcndi mi I .) EPCO endorsed 
ai: id it legotiated cacl i cl icel ;: [D Mil 17; ;, Il 5 . l(: ] 
W o r k P e r f o r m e d on the B u i l d i n g s A ft or I M a w R e q u e s t l);He*> 
T h e va lue of w o r k P P C O per fo rmed on i i i m m n g l ane i Us l inai . April ! 1. ^ 0 0 ] } 
di a :" 'r i xp lest (v 4 lie 1 i >, 'as also tl it: date : 1 it :> 1< i s t l i : i i ' r< iv 'ei ) * "} 'as SI9. 590 16. S ec 1- .: i it 
111(A)(1), below, i iie valuo o; work EPCO performed oii Building 11 aitei its final, June 
25, 2001, draw request (also the date of its last lien waiver) totaled $208,751.59. See 
1 ., .
 f-cn. . - , 
:.: 
June 25, 2001, by EPCO's subcontractors, whom 51-SPR ultimately paid directly. See 
Point 111(A)(4), below. EPCO had not paid its subcontractors in full through the dates of 
its last draw requests on the two Buildings. See Point III(C), below. 
Completion of the Buildings 
EPCO's final payment applications show that work under the Building I Contract 
was complete by May 31, 2001 [Def. Ex. 8], and work under the Building II Contract was 
complete by July 31, 2001 [Def. Ex. 11]. While a few hours of work were performed 
after those dates, the parties disputed whether such work was only trivial and 
nonsubstantial, or outside the contract scope, and the when work under the two contracts 
was accepted as complete by the owner. [R.3220-23, 4383-88, 5951-55, 6155-59.] 
EPCO's final draws on the two Central Bank construction loans in April and June 
2001, respectively, exhausted the loan funds. [Tr. 8467 at 440.] Notwithstanding a 
deficiency under the construction contracts alleged by EPCO to be $850,651 [R.3034, 
3284, 3286, 3328 1j 17], EPCO still proceeded to complete the Buildings. As it turns out, 
EPCO had authorized during construction $835,990 in draws to Hatch's two companies, 
Vintage and Broadstone—which were not EPCO subcontractors—for work that was 
never performed on the two buildings. [Def. Ex. 35; Tr. 8466 at 107-08, 138-50.] As a 
result of Hatch's looting of the construction loan proceeds, which EPCO authorized, the 
construction loan proceeds were exhausted before EPCO and its subcontractors had been 
completely paid. 
In August or September 2001, 51-SPR became aware of Hatch's misappropriation 
of construction funds, 51-SPR's principal Robert Chimento confronted Hatch, and Hatch 
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agreed to relinquisl i to 51 SI "R Broadstoi ie' s one 1 lalf interest in the propert) [' I i 8 16 ) 
he has apparent ly remained ever s ince.
 L i i . S 4 ( > 6 a t i ! -• ' Bv the t ime 51-SPR 
as sumed control <>i the Propert)/ , B r o a d s t o r - had defaul ted unde r the two construct ion 
loai is froi i i Cci iti al Bai ill ; [R 21 / 8 at 138 39 ] I c c t ' old foi eclosi n • i • : i i tl ie I }i :»pei t) ait id 
the loss of its $2.9 million investment, 51-SPR entered into an agreement with Central 
Bank to assume Broadstone's loan obligations. [Id ,] 
M ec lit a nics ' ' I Jens on the Pi opei t\ 
On Novembei i J, 2ow-+, EPCO filed a mechanics' lien against Building I and 
Building II in the total amount of $850,65; "" T ; Fx H.l FPCO's lien included a 
ciair. ui? ii, > > ' HIO paymei , ^i^n » compam , ^ A I ,*n:,truv. lion, ioi *.<.,K 
p.. > ' «i • ,i ~ • • i >• ' ' | ! \ ; 
amounts claimed b\ EPCO's subcontractors, Hansen, Halverson, AlLuic, and 
Westwood, ui.'.- * .u i. i.u-ii UK ir own mechanics' lions against the Buildings. [Id. at 96 
9 7 | I IP( X ) i ICY ei par :! t :> tl ie si lbcoi iti actoi s tl ic ai i l :>i u its claii i v :xi ii :i tl I zh liei is [1 d _ ] 5 I 
SPR requested that EPCO indemnify 51-SPR against the claims of the subcontractors, but 
EPCO refused.. [R.3217, 7750.] 
V 'iti i tl ie exceptioi i c >f EPCO, 51 SI *R \ lltii i latch - satisf ied tl ie • :laii i is o f every 
mechanics' lien claimant that I latch and EPCO had hired to perform work on .no 
Property, [Tr. 8467 at 516 20; see also note 17, below,] Several of tl ie subcontractors' 
ck liii i is wei e litigated, ai id 51 SI fR ii ICI it it. ccl attoi i ie;; ' fees at id dai i lages litigatii ig tl lose 
c la ims . [See note 1.7, be low, R.7747 , 7784.] 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On several bases, the trial court erred in denying 51-SPR's various claims and 
defenses and entering judgment in favor of EPCO. First, the trial court erred in ruling as 
a matter of law that a joint venture was created between 51-SPR and Broadstone and 
Hatch because the agreement at issue specifically excludes an essential element of joint 
venture—a duty to share in losses sustained by the development. 
Second, the trial court incorrectly ruled on summary judgment that EPCO's lien 
was timely when it was disputed when EPCO completed its work on the two buildings 
and when the owner accepted EPCO's work as complete. 
Third, the trial court erred in failing to apply the valid, enforceable lien waivers 
that the trial court ruled on summary judgment to be binding and enforceable. The lien 
waivers included provisions waiving lien rights with respect to 51-SPR's property, 
indemnifying 51-SPR against subcontractor claims, and guaranteeing that all 
subcontractors had been paid. 
Fourth, the trial court incorrectly denied 51-SPR's abusive lien claim, which arose 
from EPCO's effort to exact, through its lien, payment by 51-SPR of $78,000 that EPCO 
had made to Hatch's company for work that benefited only the Williams Property, and 
which was never even performed by EPCO. 
Fifth, the trial court's award of attorney fees to EPCO should be reversed based on 
EPCO's failure to differentiate among its various compensable and noncompensable 
claims. Remand for a redetermination of attorney fees will also be necessary depending 
on the outcome of this appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
L THERE WAS NO JOIN I V EN I I JR E BEr FWFF> " ^r ' 
BROADSTONE AND HA IXMI 
A. By shifting the Duty to Share Losses to Broadstone, Addendum No. 2 
Expressly Precludes Any Finding of Joint Venture. 
Because 5 I SPR had ••.-.) duty to share in losses of the Northshore project, the trial 
court erred when it daumnKd on summary judgment that a joint venture was created 
between k I SPR .111-1 \\Mr\\ and 1 ?.!u;s(k,ton ,\ dub, i ,1 i.u-• in fh< I ' 'ii1-- of ( l ie 
enterprise is "essential" to establish a joint venture. Betenson v. Call Auto & Equip. 
Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684. 6S6 (Utah iv,\/'). As a mattei of law. there can be no -i-m* 
\ ei iti ii e abs< ;»
 s . .« •; .r. .a i ;i IU- : • iv - cm ?e existed 
where contract provision for "shared liability for losses" was "conspicuou ' j - i1 • ^ "); 
Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1. 2 (I 'tab 1 ° "4) (holding thai no joint \ e n t u i e existed v\heie 
defendant stone* u; M.,V. m-* investment in transactu-.i,. u , , ,^i ,,o duty to share m -..isuiess 
losses). 
Here , as in Betenson, there was in joint \ en iu iv because the par t ies ' agreement , 
Addendum ; \o 2. bestows on > I SPR v." rh ty to share in losses and instead "specifically 
excli n le[s]v si n I: , ; „. In it; /. 6 1 5 F ,|! 2 1 it 68(: : ^ < 1 , 1 1 1 Br< >; a 1; ;t< ) i i< ; i i< )t 51 SPR was 
solely responsible ioi all expenses costs, losses, and risks associated with the project. 
[Id.; H !"ni « ' ' !t was Rroadstone, on its own behalf, which executed all of the 
See also Johanson Bros. Builders v. Board of Review, 222 P.2d 503, M) / 11 UMI 
lO^h (holding that no partnership existed where members of alleged partnership were 
not chargeable w ith losses); First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Gillman, 158 B.R. 498, 509 
(1). I !tah 1993) (holding tha! j«*int \ enlme did not iwisi under I hah la^ because theie was 
no duty to share in other pari) \s losses). Cf, Utah Code Ann. i; 4S-1- :i it 2) (2«)0?) 
(providing that joint \ e n i u r e is governed by I Mah Panm-islnp \e t i. 
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contracts associated with the Property, including loan documents, construction contracts, 
construction loans, and tenant leases. [Add. K; R.lOOl ^ j 11-12.] Hatch and 
Parkinson—Broadstone's principals—personally guaranteed the construction loans. 
[Add. K; R.lOOl f 13.] 51-SPR was not a party to any of these guaranties or agreements. 
[Add. K; R.lOOl fflf 14-15.] As a result, under the Agreement, 51-SPR stood to lose only 
its investment in the Property and nothing more. [R.lOOl f^ 10.] Based on these facts, the 
necessary duty to share in losses did not exist and as a matter of law, there could be no 
joint venture. 
However, disregarding the plain language of Addendum No. 2 and dismissing 
Chimento's sworn testimony as "bald assertions," the trial court "inferred" a duty to share 
in losses from three sources, not one of which is legally sufficient. Joint Venture Order at 
9-11 (Add. B). First, the trial court inferred a duty to share in losses from 51-SPR's 
agreement to mortgage its ownership in the Property so that Broadstone and Hatch could 
secure construction financing. Id. at 10. However, by mortgaging its interest in the 
Property (which had been purchased with 51-SPR's investment funds), 51-SPR stood to 
lose only its investment and nothing more. As a matter of law, the risk of losing one's 
investment does not evidence a duty to share in losses. See Bassett, 530 P.2d at 2. To 
hold otherwise would turn into a partner the typical investor who stands to lose the extent 
of its investment. 
Second, the trial court inferred a duty to share losses from the fact that Broadstone 
and 51-SPR were to hold the Property as tenants in common, which the court said brings 
"all the accompanying liabilities of a real property owner." Joint Venture Order at 10 
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(Add B) 1 1 lis fact is immaterial because all common owners of real property are subject 
t o s u i ' l l ' " l u l i i l i l i i " i l i i ! i nn li'i 1 If.ill \t\\\ , i n i iK iHi i i i i w i i c i s h i p * »l p i o p n l v dot**, m i l n l 
itself establish a partnership, even if there is a sharing of profits. See Utah Code Ann. § 
48-1-4(2) (2002). Moreover, liabilities incidental to property ownership are not losses 
i ui,vL*jL!i,,» • • - h ; •• - ::•. * - vii:.. ;• share. 
Third, the trial court inferred a duty to shaic m io • . * I'l^ s ! 
settlement agreemen: v iih f\ »,ri;i1 Bank not Broadstone or Hatch to guarantee 
r«»': I«L::I «-,! i.- coih-aiih I,. . !o:m^ J... , Venture Order a? ' - - ''ii** fact ^ 
immaterial becau^ - : ?MJ 
assume the mortgage. ^ ! ^ r i . < -i;K Ju ; . ,..* a\oid foreclosure after Hatch defaulted on 
ti.. - - a ,iiM i.,.*. .;.. i , i u i , u . u - r * it ^ 8 ^O 1 *1 SPR's decision to ^ m if 
losses. 
In sum, the facts from vh i r l , ihc dial co.nl : ifcrred a duty to share in losses are 
legal lb ' ii ISI lfficier it I : :i eatc a cii ity to si lai c ii i losse s in ICI n re d fay tl le i eal estate 
development. Based on express lam* uin-e of Addendum No. 2, 51-bPi- '' • •• such duiv 
Since EPCO cannot satisfy this essential element of joint venture, the joint venture claim 
fails as a i r lattc i • : i la * : ' 
B• At Minimum, "1 nable issu.es Lxisted Regarding W hethei 51-SI Ml 
Agreed to Share Losses with Broadstone. 
At > :! ^ immai ) judgment was precliuk.u because the inal court cannot 
"ii lfer" a duty to share in losses oi i si n i n i iiat y ji idgi i ICI: it. \: at tici llai ly ii i. ligl it of R obci t 
Chimento's affidavit testimony that Hatch and Broadstone were solely responsible for 
"all expenses, costs, losses, and risks associated with the Northshore project." [R.1001 ^ 
6.] All inferences should have been viewed in 51-SPR's favor and any dispute of fact 
precludes summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Willard Pease Oil and Gas Co. 
v. Pioneer Oil and Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995). Moreover, a joint venture 
determination fails as a matter of law when there is no evidence to support an essential 
element, see Bassett 530 P.2d at 2; Betenson, 645 P.2d at 686. A joint venture ordinarily 
cannot be found as a matter of law because it involves questions of fact, see Rogers v. 
M.O. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 1987); Jaeger v. West. Rivers Fly Fisher, 
855 F. Supp. 1217, 1225 (D. Utah 1994). Here, the affidavit testimony and agreement at 
minimum created a fact question whether 51-SPR agreed to a duty to share in losses. If 
this Court does not hold that there was no joint venture as a matter of law, 51-SPR is 
entitled to reversal of the Joint Venture Order and remand for an evidentiary hearing on 
this issue. 
II. DISPUTED FACTS PRECLUDED ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE TIMELINESS OF EPCO'S MECHANICS' LIENS. 
The trial court erred when it weighed evidence and determined on summary 
judgment that EPCO's November 16, 2001, mechanics' lien was timely. Lien Timeliness 
Order at 2 (Add. E). As this Court has recognized, the lien claimant must meet a two-
pronged, fact-intensive test when determining when the filing period for a mechanics' 
lien begins to run: 
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1. The work "has been 'substantially completed,' leaving only 
minor or trivial work to be accomplished"; and 
2. The work "has been accepted by the owner." 
Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs., 827 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992) ("Interiors I"). Here, the trial court even went so far as to enter what it 
called "findings" on summary judgment with respect to these disputed issues of 
completion and acceptance.8 However, based on disputed facts with respect to both 
prongs of Interiors I, summary judgment is precluded. 
A. The Parties Disputed the Final Completion Date of the Buildings. 
Work is complete for purposes of the mechanics' lien statute when "only minor or 
trivial work" remains. Interiors I, 827 P.2d at 966-67. Assessing whether work is minor 
or trivial is a fact-sensitive issue that requires evidence-weighing: considering the work 
performed in light of the value of the entire contract and the importance of the work on 
the given project. Id. This first prong was only resolved in Interiors I after the court 
weighed evidence at trial and entered express findings. See id. 
In the present case, the parties hotly contested when work on both Buildings was 
"substantially completed."9 Interiors I, 827 P.2d at 965. The trial court wholly ignored 
The "findings" were not based on any evidentiary hearing or presentation of 
evidence, and were inappropriate on summary judgment. See Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt 
Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 948 (Utah 1996) (trial court inappropriately entered 
findings of fact in a summary judgment order). 
The trial court correctly noted that the mechanics' lien statute in effect at the time 
this action was filed provided that a notice of mechanics' lien must be filed within 90 
days from the date of "final completion" of an original contract. See Ruling at 5 (Add. 
C) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(b) (2001)). EPCO argued without any legislative 
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this when it ruled as a matter of law that substantial, nontrivial work was performed on 
both Buildings within 90 days of EPCO's November 13, 2001, mechanics' lien notice. 
L The Parties Disputed the Date Building I Work Was Completed. 
The fact disputes with respect to the completion of Building I work centered on 
EPCO's own certification that its HVAC subcontract with Halverson was 100% complete 
by March 2001, and the entire Building I Contract was 100% complete two months later. 
[R.4310, 4320, 4400-01.] These certifications created a fact dispute whether work 
performed after May 2001 was merely trivial or insubstantial, and even whether such 
work was within the scope of the Building I Contract. If the work was outside the 
contract scope or was merely trivial, its performance could not extend the 90-day period 
within which EPCO could record a mechanics' lien. 
Moreover, the only work that was allegedly performed on Building I after May 31, 
2001, consisted of eleven hours—or about $550—of work performed by A&T, 
history that the statute's reference to "final completion" suggested an intent to abrogate 
nearly 70 years of Utah authority that trivial, nonsubstantial work does not toll the 
deadline for filing a mechanics' lien. [R.6156.] The trial court never addressed EPCO's 
argument, instead correctly focusing on whether EPCO's post-completion work was 
trivial. See Ruling at 6-7 [R.5449-50]. In any event, EPCO's argument should be 
rejected once and for all based on the legislature's two recent amendments to the statute, 
which now expressly define "final completion" as the date on which (1) a final certificate 
of occupancy is issued; (2) a certificate of final inspection is issued, or (3) no "substantial 
work" is left to be performed. Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a) (Supp. 2004) (including 
both the amendment effective until May 1, 2005, and the amendment effective 
thereafter), emphasis supplied. While these amendments are not binding in this case, 
they are evidence of the legislature's intent when it used the term "final completion" in 
the pertinent statute. 
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Halverson's subcontractor.10 [R.4401-04.] Notably, this work represented a smaller 
percentage of the overall contract price—a mere 0.021% ($550 / $2.6 million)—than the 
amount that this Court held to be "insubstantial and minor and trivial in nature" in 
Interiors 1—0.031% ($28 / $90,000). 827 P.2d at 967 [R.5953 & n.2]. At the very least, 
the trial court improperly held as a matter of law that the small amount of Building I 
work performed after May 2001 was not trivial. 
2. The Parties Disputed the Date Building II Work Was 
Completed. 
Likewise, numerous fact disputes existed about when Building II work was 
completed. First, while EPCO claimed on summary judgment to have performed work 
on Building II within 90 days of its November 16, 2001, lien, EPCO had certified that the 
Building II Contract was 100% complete—and a final retention was due—as of the end 
of July 2001. [R.4300, 4398-99.] Other than the $78,000 change order for work 
provided on the unrelated Williams Property, the only changes that appeared on EPCO's 
final payment application after July 2001 were a net $806 in change orders—0.039% 
($806 / $2,045,898) of the final contract price on Building II. [R.4302-06, 4392-4400; 
The trial court seems to suggest that work in addition to A&T's was performed 
on Building I after May 2001. See Findings and Order at 4 ^ 22 (Add. D) (providing that 
"Ellsworth employees and its subcontractors were performing work on Building I in 
September and October 2001"). However, there is no support for this statement in the 
summary judgment record. Rather, as stated in EPCO's own summary judgment 
memorandum and supporting affidavit, the work provided by EPCO in September and 
October 2001 was on Building II—not Building I. [R.2977 at ^ 7; R.3028 at ^ 10.] 
The trial court denied 51-SPR's motion to reconsider the timeliness rulings with 
respect to Building I. See Order Denying 51-SPR's Motion to Reconsider the Rulings on 
the Timeliness of Building I Liens at 2 (July 9, 2003) (Add. F). 
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Def. Ex. 12.] These payment applications create a dispute whether work performed on 
Building II within 90 days of EPCO's lien was trivial. 
Second, for the three subcontractors that EPCO claimed to have performed work 
after July 2001—Kimco, Clayco, and Design West—EPCO introduced no evidence that 
any of their work was done pursuant to the Building II Contract. [R.43 86-87, 4392-
4400.] The plans for Building II called for the construction of a building shell, and did 
not include such tenant improvements as these three subcontractors would provide. 
[R.4398-4400.] Tenant finishes were to be added later through change orders, and EPCO 
was unable to show on summary judgment that the tenant improvement work of these 
subcontractors was within the original contract scope or authorized by a valid change 
order. Id. The work done by those subcontractors could well have been done under a 
separate contract they performed for 51-SPR for tenant finish work. [R.4322 at 65-66.] 
These disputed facts precluded summary judgment. 
Third, the invoices of all three subcontractors reflect that they had completed all 
their work by July 2001. [R.4392-96.] These invoices were sufficient to create a factual 
dispute over the completion date. 
Fourth, even if EPCO and its subcontractors' own records proved incorrect, the 
subcontractors' own testimony creates disputes whether their post-July-2001 work was 
merely nominal, remedial, or outside the scope of the Building II Contract. Kimco 
testified that its entire fire sprinkler system was completely installed by July 2001, 
leaving only "[f]inish and testing of the system, [and] passing it off with the city," and 
other work outside the scope of the Contract. [R.4395.] Next, Clayco testified that it 
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only worked less than eighteen hours in September 2001. [R.4393.] Finally, Design 
West conceded that its post-July-2001 time sheets referred only to work outside the 
original Building II contract scope. [R.4392.] Based on this testimony, it remains in 
dispute whether—and if so, how much—work was performed by the subcontractors 
within the scope of the Building II Contract after they claimed their work was 100% 
complete in July 2001. [R.4392-96.] On these alternative bases, summary judgment 
with respect to the completion of Building II was inappropriate. The Court should 
reverse and remand for trial on the issue of when completion occurred. 
B. The Parties Disputed the Date That Work Was Accepted. 
The trial court all but ignored the second prong of Interiors I—acceptance by the 
owner. The trial court recognized that acceptance by the owner was necessary and 
opined with no analysis—and in spite of disputed facts—that acceptance for both 
Buildings occurred only after A&T completed its eleven hours for Hatch on Building I. 
See Ruling at 7 (Add. C). The trial court's ruling flatly contradicts this Court's rulings in 
both Interiors I and Interiors II. 
This Court held in Interiors I that the owner's recalling of the contractor to 
perform additional work was not dispositive of acceptance. See 827 P.2d at 968-69. 
Rather, evidence relevant to acceptance needed to be weighed and findings of fact 
entered on remand. Id, The fact that the owner called the contractor back to perform 
additional work and refused to pay the contractor until the work was completed were 
insufficient to determine—as a matter of law—that the owner had accepted the work as 
complete. kL 
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The exact same scenario presents itself here, where Hatch conditioned payment on 
A&T's returning to perform additional work. [R.4401-04.] Under Interiors I, the trial 
court was not entitled without more to rule as a matter of law on the issue of when 
acceptance occurred. 
The Interiors II case—which followed after Interiors I's remand—also shows the 
trial court's error. There, findings of fact were entered on remand on the issue of 
acceptance. Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs., 881 P.2d 
929, 931-32 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Interiors II"). Even though the owner called the 
contractor back to perform additional work and even conditioned payment on 
performance of additional work, the additional work did not extend the time for filing a 
mechanics' lien. Id. at 932-33. Rather, the work was accepted prior to the date the 
contractor was called back to the job site by the owner. Id. 
The relevant findings in Interiors II that suggested a prior acceptance (none of 
which appeared alone to be dispositive) are similar to the instant case. For example, in 
Interiors II, the contractor (not the owner) "considered the work completed and believed 
that he was entitled to payment." Id at 932. Likewise, in this case, Halverson (whose 
work A&T performed) and EPCO considered Halverson's work completed long before 
A&T returned to the job in September 2001, a shown by EPCO's payment applications. 
See Point 11(A)(1), above. Interiors II also found that tenants had moved into the 
building. 881 P.2d at 932. Here, tenants moved into the building long before September 
2001, and a certificate of occupancy had even been issued on Building I effective April 
10, 2001. [R.855.] In sum, under Interiors II, the trial court could not rule on the 
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acceptance issue as a matter of law. The Court should reverse and remand for trial on 
when EPCO's work on the Buildings was accepted as complete. 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE PROVISIONS OF 
THE LIEN WAIVERS EVEN AFTER CORRECTLY FINDING THE LIEN 
WAIVERS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE, 
One of the critical issues below involved the lien waivers printed on the reverse 
side of the Central Bank checks that EPCO signed throughout the construction of the 
Buildings. Like the virtually identical lien waivers that this Court upheld in the case of 
Neiderhauser Builders and Development Corp. v. Campbell 824 P.2d 1193, 1194-95 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), absent some showing of fraud, EPCO is bound by each lien waiver 
that it signed. Each lien waiver contained waiver, guaranty, and indemnity language. 
[Add. L.] While the trial court initially—and correctly—found the lien waivers to be 
valid and enforceable as a matter of law, the trial court erred when it subsequently 
refused to apply them. As a result, this Court should reverse and remand with 
instructions to apply the lien waivers. 
A. The Trial Court Should Have Applied the Waiver Provisions to 
EPCO's Mechanics9 Lien Claim. 
The trial court erred in entering judgment against 51-SPR on EPCO's lien 
foreclosure claim without accounting for EPCO's knowing, voluntary waiver. Prior to 
trial, the trial court had granted 51-SPR and Central Bank summary judgment that "[e]ach 
of the checks prepared by Central Bank included language regarding the release of lien 
rights," as follows: 
In consideration of payment of this check, payee by negotiating this check 
waives, releases, and relinquishes all rights of lien or claims payee may 
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have up to the date of the draw request described on the reverse side hereof 
(the "Draw Date"), upon the property described on the reverse side hereof 
(the "Property"). 
Findings and Order at 3 J^ 11 (Add. D). With respect to this language, the trial court held: 
By endorsing the Central Bank checks, Ellsworth [Paulsen] . . . waived [its] 
claims and lien rights for work performed prior to the date that [its] draws 
were requested . . . . The date of the draw request is the date on which 
[EPCO] requested the draw, not the date the check was received or cashed. 
Id at 6 f 1 (emphasis supplied). 
The trial court's ruling was correct. As the trial court observed in its 
memorandum decision [R.5451-52], the waiver provisions of the Central Bank lien 
waivers are virtually indistinguishable from those in Neiderhauser, which 
"unambiguously waivefd] all lien rights accrued to the date of the waiver." 824 P.2d at 
1196; see Ruling at 4-5 (Add. C). Under this ruling, EPCO was only entitled to recover 
"the value of the services rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment 
furnished" to the Property after the effective date of its lien waivers. Utah Code Ann. § 
38-1-3(2002). 
Inexplicably, however, the trial court completely failed to apply the waivers at 
trial, notwithstanding uncontroverted evidence of the effective dates of EPCO's lien 
waivers—April 11, 2001, for Building I and June 25, 2001, for Building II—and as 
discussed below, the value of work performed from the dates of the lien waivers until 
EPCO did not appeal from this ruling and, consequently, is not entitled to 
challenge it in its cross-appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 3(d) ("The notice of appeal. . . shall 
designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from."); Jensen v. 
Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10, ffi| 5-9, 977 P.2d 474 (under Rule 3(d), 
refusing to hear appeal from previous order that did not relate to verdict and order 
identified in notice of appeal). 
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completion of the two construction contracts. Because the trial court failed to apply the 
lien waivers, the judgment on EPCO's lien foreclosure claim should be reversed. 
1. Uncontroverted Evidence Established That the Value of EPCO's 
Work on Building I After the Draw Date Was $19,590.16. 
According to the testimony of EPCO's employees, the value of work performed 
on Building I from the April 11, 2001, lien waiver date until final completion was only 
$19,590.16. [Def. Ex. 40.] EPCO's controller, Joe Brinkerhoff, testified that after March 
31, 2001, the value of work performed on Building I was no greater than $23,900, as 
reflected by the positive entries13 on EPCO's own final Building I payment application 
for April and May 2001. [Def. Ex. 8; Tr. 8467 at 474-77.] Since EPCO did not maintain 
any record of daily values, Brinkerhoff was aware of no better way to determine how 
much of the $23,900 was performed from April 11, 2001 to May 31, 2001, than by 
simply prorating over the 61-day period of April and May. [Tr. 8467 at 477-78.] Based 
on a proration analysis, the total work performed from April 11, 2001, until final 
completion was $19,590.16. [Tr. 8467 at 478-79; see also Def. Ex. 40 (summary of 
proration analysis); Tr. 8467 at 497-99 (receipt of proration analysis).14] 
The final Building I payment application shows total work performed after 
March 2001 of negative $16,704, based on negative change orders accounted for in that 
application. [Def. Ex. 8 at 6, Column E; Tr. 8467 at 475-76.] When negative change 
orders for the period are removed, the amount of work performed in the period (as listed 
in Column E) totals $23,900. [Def. Ex. 8 at 2-6, Column E; Tr. 8467 at 477.] 
Defendant's Exhibit 40 also summarized a proration analysis that deducted 
disputed change orders, but those Building I change orders are not disputed in this appeal. 
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2. Incontroverted Evidence Established That the Value of EPCO's 
Work on Building II After the Draw Date Was $208,751.59. 
The analysis for Building II was the same, albeit involving three payment 
applications, numbered 8, 9, and 10, for the period after the June 25, 2001, lien waiver 
date on Building II. [Def. Ex. 10 (application no. 8—June 2001); Def. Ex. 11 
(application no. 9—July 2001); Def. Ex. 12 (application no. 10—August 2001).] First, 
EPCO's Joe Brinkerhoff testified that the positive entries on application no. 8 for work 
performed in June 2001 totaled $339,736.31. [Def. Ex. 10 at CB 52 (page 5 of app. no. 
8); Def. Ex. 37 at 2 (summary of app. no. 8); Tr. 8467 at 488-89.] Prorating this amount 
over the 30 days in June 2001 provides a daily amount of $11,324.54, which for the final 
five days in June after the draw date of June 25, 2001, totals $56,622.72. [Def. Ex. 37 at 
3; Tr. 8467 at 489.] 
Second, Brinkerhoff testified that the positive entries on application no. 9 for work 
performed in July 2001 totaled $149,936.87. [Def. Ex. 11 at 5 (app. no. 9); Def. Ex. 38 at 
2 (summary of app. no. 9); Tr. 8467 at 491-92.] 
Third, Brinkerhoff stated that the positive time entries on application no. 10 for 
work on the remainder of the Building II Contract totaled $80,192. [Def. Ex. 12 at 5 
(app. no. 10); Def. Ex. 39 (summary of app. no. 10); Tr. 8467 at 488-89.] However, of 
this amount, $78,000 arises from the change order for work performed on the Williams 
Property, which the trial court correctly determined is not chargeable to 51-SPR's 
property. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9 j^ 21 (May 18, 2004) (Add. 
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I); Def. Ex. 39. Deducting the $78,000 change order from the $80,192 in positive entries 
on application no. 10 leaves $2192. 
In sum, based on these three final payment applications on Building II, the 
summaries thereof, and Brinkerhoff s testimony, the value of work performed after the 
date of EPCO's last lien waiver on Building II (June 25, 2001) totaled $208,751.59 
($56,622.72 + $149,936.87 + $2192). 
3. Judgment on EPCO's Mechanics' Lien Claims Should Not Have 
Exceeded the Uncontroverted Value of Work That Was Not 
Waived. 
Rather than enter separate judgments on EPCO's contract claim and mechanics' 
lien claim, the trial court conflated the two claims. The trial court found that the balances 
due under the two construction contracts were $199,830.53 on Building I and 
$364,991.26 on Building II. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 4 f^ 1 (Add. I). 
These amounts were derived simply from EPCO's collection reports, which did not 
reflect any amounts waived by the lien waivers. See PL Ex. 5 at 2-3 (showing amounts 
due on Building I for payment app. nos. 7 and 8, which were entirely waived, and 
payment app. no. 9, which was partially waived, see Point 111(A)(1), above); PL Ex. 6 at 
2-3 (showing amounts due on Building II for payment app. no. 8, which was partially 
waived, see Point 111(A)(2), above). The trial court failed to enter a separate judgment on 
the mechanics' lien claim that took into account the application of the lien waivers. 
Notwithstanding uncontroverted evidence of the value of work performed on the two 
Buildings after the dates of the lien waivers—$19,590.16 and $208,751.59, 
respectively—the trial court merely entered judgment on the mechanics' lien claim for 
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the contract balances. This Court should reverse and remand with instructions to apply 
the lien waivers according to the uncontro verted evidence of the value of work performed 
after the applicable draw dates. 
4. The Mechanics1 Lien Claims Should Also Be Reduced to the 
Extent They Include Work Performed by EPCO's 
Subcontractors, Whom 51-SPR Has Paid. 
The trial court should have gone even one step further in calculating the amount of 
EPCO's mechanics' lien. 51-SPR presented uncontroverted testimony from three of 
EPCO's own subcontractors—Halverson, Allstate, and Westwood, each of whom 51-
SPR paid in full by the time of trial—that they had performed $94,402 in work under the 
Building II Contract after June 25, 2001,which was the Draw Date on Building II. [Tr. 
8468 at 661-62.] 
First, Blair Halverson of A&T (Halverson's subcontractor) testified that at least 
$6,000 of A&T's work under the Building II Contract was performed after June 25, 2001. 
[Tr. 8467 at 505-06.] Second, Melanie Prawitt from Westwood testified that Westwood 
performed $32,879 in work under the Building II Contract after June 25, 2001 (in July 
2001). [Tr. 8468 at 539^0; Def. Ex. 41.] Third, Lee Barnes of Allstate Electric testified 
that Allstate performed $55,523,17 in work under the Building II Contract after June 25, 
2001.15 [Tr. 8468 at 581-82; Def. Ex. 67.] None of this evidence was controverted. 
The value of work performed by these subcontractors on Building II after the lien 
waiver date of June 25, 2001—totaling $94,402—is included in the $208,751.59 figure 
Like Brinkerhoff, Barnes' calculation included a proration of Allstate's June 
2001 invoice. [Tr. 8468 at 578-81; Def. Ex. 67 (summarizing Def. Ex. 44).] 
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(work performed by EPCO and its subcontractors after June 25, 2001). And, EPCO did 
not dispute at trial that 51-SPR paid these three subcontractors in full, and that EPCO was 
not entitled to recover for their work. [Tr. 8466 at 6; Tr. 8467 at 528-30; Def. Ex. 67.] 
The trial court erred by not reducing EPCO's mechanics' lien claim on Building II from 
$208,751.59 to $114,349.59, to avoid providing a recovery to EPCO for work performed 
by its subcontractors after June 25, 2001, which 51-SPR paid in full. 
B. The Trial Court Erred When It Refused to Enforce the Plain, 
Unambiguous Indemnity Provision of the Lien Waivers Against EPCO, 
The trial court erred when it cast aside plain, unambiguous indemnity language in 
the lien waivers and determined on summary judgment that EPCO had no duty to 
indemnify 51-SPR against the claims of EPCO's subcontractors.16 See Indemnity Order 
at 2 (Add. G). The indemnity provision in the lien waivers signed by EPCO plainly 
requires EPCO to indemnify and hold harmless 51-SPR—the property owner—from any 
claims by EPCO's subcontractors: 
Payee agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the owner of the Property and 
Central Bank or its assigns from any loss, claims, or expenses incurred by 
51-SPR moved for summary judgment on the indemnity language and the 
warranty and guaranty language [R.3217-18], and EPCO failed to address these issues 
[R.4707-08]. When the court asked why EPCO had not briefed that issue, EPCO's 
counsel explained the omission by stating, "That specific area wasn't responded to 
because we deemed it without merit. We actually thought that it was so trivial and so on 
the fringe of an argument that it would not be seriously considered." [Tr. 8464 at 17:11-
14.] It was error for the trial court not to enter summary judgment at that point based on 
EPCO's nonresponse. At a later oral argument, when 51-SPR requested a ruling 
enforcing the indemnity, warranty, and guaranty language the trial court invited 
supplemental briefing. [Tr. 8470 at 33.] After supplemental briefing [R.7746-51] and 
oral argument [Tr. 8471 at 4 4 ^ 6 ] , the trial court denied 51-SPR's motion [id. at 47; 
Indemnity Order at 2 (Add. G)]. 
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them by reason of or rising out of any liens or claims made against the 
Property by any supplier of labor or material at the insistence of payee. 
[Add. L, emphasis supplied.] Like any other contract, an indemnity agreement is 
interpreted according to its plain language. Gate City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dalton, 
808 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 51-SPR was a third-party beneficiary to the 
indemnity provision. See Broadwater v. Old Rep. Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 536 (Utah 1993) 
(third party beneficiary exists where contract shows that contracting parties "clearly 
intended to confer a separate and distinct benefit upon the third party"). 
Absent some showing that the indemnity language is ambiguous—there has been 
none—indemnification is required as a matter of law. Moreover, as evidenced by the fact 
that 51-SPR defended against and settled subcontractor claims, see note 17, below, it 
cannot be disputed that EPCO has failed to indemnify 51-SPR. The trial court failed to 
enforce this provision, instead simply adopted three of EPCO's legally insufficient 
arguments for denying indemnification. See Indemnity Order at 2 (Add. G). 
First, the trial court opined that 51-SPR "did not pay the contract balances" and 
that such payment "is a condition precedent to the indemnity claim." IcL This position is 
meritless. "The intention to create a condition in a contract must appear expressly or by 
clear implication." Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 953 (Utah 1978). EPCO has not 
pointed to any language in lien waivers (much less the separate construction contracts to 
which 51-SPR was not a party) that conditions indemnification on payment under the 
construction contracts. [R. 7762-65.] Indeed, the indemnity is absolute, unconditional, 
and enforceable. 
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Second, the trial court cited an alleged lack of consideration. See Indemnity Order 
at 2 (Add. G). This is unavailing. Consideration may be found when "there is any act or 
forbearance bargained for and given in exchange for the promise of another." Peirce v. 
Pdrce, 2000 UT 7, t 21, 994 P.2d 193 (emphasis supplied). Here, as the lien waiver 
itself confirms, the consideration for each lien waiver (including the indemnity provision) 
is the corresponding payment EPCO received from Central Bank. [Add. L. (stating that 
lien waivers are "[i]n consideration of payment of this check").] Central Bank owed no 
legal obligation to EPCO nor its subcontractors to issue checks. Rather, Central Bank's 
only duties stemmed from a contractual relationship it had with Broadstone, the account 
holder. Thus, the very issuance of the checks constitutes sufficient consideration to 
validate and enforce EPCO's duty to indemnify. 
Third, the trial court suggested that 51-SPR has not suffered damages from the 
failure to indemnify. See Indemnity Order at 2 (Add. G). This basis also fails. Four 
EPCO subcontractors filed or foreclosed on mechanics' liens on the Property totaling 
$242,538. [Def. Ex. 47.] EPCO did not pay anything toward those subcontractor claims. 
[Tr. 8466 at 97.] Instead, 51-SPR defended against them and ultimately settled with all 
four subcontractors for the aggregate sum of $442,283.58.17 While the principal amount 
of $242,538 was offset against EPCO's judgment [PI. Ex. 27], the difference paid to the 
i n 
After obtaining a judgment of foreclosure [Def. Ex. 25], Allstate and Westwood 
executed on letters of credit securing the judgment in the amounts of $187,500 and 
$52,602, respectively [Def. Ex. 31 at \ \ D; R.4105-06, 4149-50], and received 
additional settlement payments from 51-SPR of $26,594.87 and $41,985.71, respectively 
[Def. Ex. 31 at 2 1f 6]. Hansen and Halverson's claims were settled by 51-SPR for 
$10,601 and $123,000, respectively. [Def. Exs. 30 at 2 \ 2(c), 66 at 2 ^  2.] These 
payments to subcontractors totaled $442,283.58. 
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subcontractors—$199,745.58—has never been accounted to 51-SPR, nor have 51-SPR's 
costs and attorney fees in defending against those claims. 
51-SPR is not asserting that the indemnity language eliminates its liability for the 
value of the subcontractors' work. Rather, if EPCO could show that the subcontractors' 
work was performed and within the scope of the Contracts, EPCO would have been able 
to include the value of such work—up to the $242,538 the subcontractors claimed—in its 
own lien foreclosure claims to the extent EPCO had not waived its lien rights. Had 
EPCO assumed the defense of the subcontractor claims, as it was invited to do by 51-SPR 
[R.3217, 7750], the additional damages incurred by 51-SPR could have been spared. 
In sum, by agreeing to indemnify 51-SPR, EPCO agreed to be the party who 
would settle and incur the costs of settling the subcontractors' claims. By failing to settle 
those claims, EPCO is liable to 51-SPR. This Court should reverse the trial court's 
summary denial of indemnity and remand for a trial on 51-SPR's damages for EPCO's 
breach of the indemnity provision. 
C- The Trial Court Erred When It Refused to Enforce Against EPCO the 
Guaranty and Warranty Language in the Lien Waivers. 
The trial court also erred in refusing to enforce against EPCO the warranty and 
guaranty in the lien waivers that provided as follows: 
Payee warrants and guarantees under penalty of fraud that payment in full 
has been made by payee to the suppliers of all labor and materials to the 
Property incurred up to the Draw Date at the insistence of payee. 
[Add. L.] Lumping this language together with the indemnity language discussed in 
Point III(B), above, the trial court rejected 51-SPR's claim as a matter of law. Yet, 
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neither EPCO nor the trial court offered any basis for not enforcing this provision of the 
lien waiver. Like the other language on the lien waiver, the warranty and guaranty 
language is plain, unambiguous, and enforceable. 
EPCO has not disputed 51-SPR's showing that EPCO had not paid its 
subcontractors through the applicable draw dates. [R.3217-18, 4707-08.] Nor did 
EPCO dispute at trial that 51-SPR paid all amounts claimed by EPCO's subcontractors, 
totaling $242,538 [Tr. 8466 at 96-97; PL Ex. 27, Def. Ex. 47], and that $94,402 of this 
amount was performed after the June 25, 2001, draw date on Building II (see Point 
111(A)(4), above). Had EPCO paid its subcontractors in full as it warranted and 
guaranteed, 51-SPR would not have had to pay the difference of $148,136—i.e., the 
value of work performed up to the draw date. The trial court should have found that 
EPCO breached the warranty and guaranty, and should have awarded $148,136 in 
damages. This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling dismissing the warranty and 
guaranty claim, and remand with instructions to enter judgment in this amount or, at 
minimum, to hold a trial on 51-SPR's damages. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD EPCO LIABLE FOR 
FILING AN ABUSIVE LIEN OF $78,000 FOR WORK PERFORMED ON 
THE WILLIAMS PROPERTY, 
EPCO's lien on the Northshore property included the sum of $78,000 for work 
performed by Hatch's company, Vintage Construction, on the Williams property. 
Vintage invoiced EPCO in that amount, which EPCO paid. The trial court was correct to 
bar EPCO from recovering the $78,000 through EPCO's lien foreclosure claim, but erred 
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in refusing to hold EPCO liable under the abusive lien statute for including this amount in 
its lien on 51-SPR's Property. 
A. EPCO Could Not Lien the Property for the $78,000 Paid to Vintaee. 
A contractor has no lien rights in property that did not benefit from the 
contractor's work. A contractor can only file a lien "upon the property upon or 
concerning which [the contractor itself has] rendered service, performed labor, or 
furnished or rented materials or equipment." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (2001). While a 
contractor may lien for services even if a planned building is never constructed, the lien 
must be filed on "the property concerning which he has rendered professional services." 
Zions First National Bank v. Carlson, 464 P.2d 387, 388 (Utah 1970). 
Richard Ellsworth himself conceded that he knew the $78,000 payment to Vintage 
was not based on work provided by EPCO or its subcontractors. [Tr. 8466 at 85-86.] 
Based on this simple admission that EPCO was merely reimbursing someone else who 
allegedly performed work, EPCO could not claim a mechanics' lien under section 38-1-3 
on any property. This is not all. The work—if it occurred at all—related to the Williams 
Property and thus provided no benefit at all to 51-SPR's Property. [Tr. 8466 at 61, 65, 
66, 78, 261, 270-72.] Based on uncontroverted facts, EPCO could not lien 51-SPR's 
property for the $78,000. The trial court agreed. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law at 7^1 12 (Add. I). 
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B, The Trial Court Erred by Failing to Conclude That by Claiming a Lien 
on 51-SPR's Property for the $78,000 Paid to Vintage, EPCO Is Liable 
Under 38-1-25, 
By attempting to exact through its lien on 51-SPR's property the $78,000 paid to 
Vintage, EPCO violated the abusive lien statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25 (2001) 
(reprinted in Addendum A(3)). 51-SPR is aware of only two reported Utah decisions that 
have cited section 38-1-25 since it was enacted, and both warn that contractors risk 
liability when they lien property that has not benefited from their work. See J. Pochynok 
Co. v. Smedsrud, 2003 UT App 375, t 19, 80 P.3d 563 (addressing 2001 amendment that 
added section 38-1-25(2), stating that "it is clear the intent of the amendment is to 
discourage outrageous lien claims and to encourage the settlement of lawsuits which are 
of minor financial value"); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 
47, Tj 24 & n.6, 94 P.3d 270, (observing that abusive lien statute "has the effect of 
discouraging abuse of the lien process by creating a strong disincentive for a would-be 
litigant to wrongly inflict a mechanics' lien on a property owner whose property was not 
actually enhanced"); Tr. 8468 at 649-51 (addressing Pochynok). Admittedly, since 
neither Pochynok nor Whipple required an application of section 38-1-25, the present 
case is one of first impression, albeit guided by applicable statutory intent and policy 
recognized in those two cases. 
Here, every element of section 38-1-25 is satisfied. First, EPCO is a "person 
entitled to record or file a lien." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25(1). EPCO constructed 
Building I and Building II and thus is entitled to file a lien claim to the extent it provided 
work and did not waive its lien rights. 
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Second, it is undisputed that EPCO "intentionally cause[d] a claim of lien against 
[51-SPR's] property." Id. EPCO does not contest that it filed an $850,651 mechanics' 
lien against Building I and Building II. [Tr. 8466 at 68-69, 77; PL Ex. 13.] 
Third, EPCO's lien "contains a greater demand than the sum due to be recorded or 
filed." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25(1). Richard Ellsworth conceded that EPCO's lien 
included a claim for the $78,000 payment to Vintage. [Tr. 8466 at 77-78.] EPCO's 
demand was greater than the sum due because, as discussed in Point IV(A), above, and as 
the trial court found (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 7 Tf 12), EPCO was not 
entitled to claim a lien for the $78,000 against 51-SPR's Property. 
Last, by overstating its lien, EPCO sought to exact from 51-SPR, the owner, by 
means of the excessive claim of lien more than is due. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25. This 
fact cannot be refuted. Based on Richard Ellsworth's own testimony at trial, EPCO used 
the lien to force the owner of the Property—51-SPR—to pay the $78,000. He testified: 
Q. The lien that EPCO recorded on the North Shore project that 
was built included this $78,000; isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When EPCO recorded that lien it intended to seek payment of 
that sum from the owner; isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. [W]hat you're saying is that EPCO intended to force—to use 
the force of the lien to force the owner of the North Shore property to pay 
that sum? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And even today EPCO is claiming that it's entitled to lien the 
North Shore property in that amount? 
A. Yes. 
[Tr. 8466 at 77-78.] 
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Based on these facts, as the plain language and legislative history of section 38-1-
25 both provide, EPCO should be penalized for "asserting] a claim for much more than 
[it] is legitimately owed," Pochynok, 2003 UT App 375 at Tf 18, and "wrongly inflict[ing] 
a mechanics' lien on a property owner whose property was not actually enhanced," 
Whipple, 2004 UT 47 at ^ 24. EPCO should have been found liable to 51-SPR under 
section 38-1-25 for two times the amount by which the lien including the $78,000 claim 
was overstated—$156,000. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25(2). This Court should 
reverse and remand with instructions to enter judgment against EPCO in that amount 
under the abusive lien statute. 
C. The Findings Relied on by the Trial Court in Denying the Abusive Lien 
Claim with Respect to the $78,000 Claim Were Clearly Erroneous and 
Immaterial. 
The trial court based its denial of the abusive lien claim on six findings of fact: 
that (1) Hatch instructed Ellsworth to file the lien for $78,000 [Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law ^ 23, 25 (Add. I)]; (2) Ellsworth acted in good faith [id.]; (3) 
Ellsworth did not intend to cloud the title, exact more than it believed was due, or procure 
an unjustified advantage [id. 1fl| 24, 25, 26]; (4) Hatch—not 51-SPR—owned the Property 
[id ffif 2, 25]; (5) the $78,000 was paid to Hatch and Broadstone [id If 22]; and (6) 
Ellsworth assumed that the $78,000 was possibly for Building II [id. ^ 2]. Not only are 
these findings clearly erroneous, but several are also materially irrelevant. Each finding 
is properly challenged below with marshaled evidence from the trial court record. See 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (marshaling requirement). 
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1. The Findings That Hatch Instructed Ellsworth to File the 
Mechanics' Lien Including the $78,000 Is Clearly Erroneous 
(Findings 23 and 25). 
The trial court relied in part on a finding that EPCO liened 51-SPR's property at 
the instruction of Hatch. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at ^ 23, 25 (Add. 
I). However, there was no evidence that Mr. Hatch ever directed Ellsworth to file a lien 
on the Northshore Property, much less a lien that included the $78,000. Only the 
following relevant evidence can be marshaled: 
1. In August 1999, Hatch requested that Ellsworth pay the $78,000 to 
Vintage for design and engineering costs on the Williams Property [Tr. 8466 at 34, 
61-62]; 
2. Ellsworth "assumed" that the $78,000 was for design and 
engineering work on the Williams Property [icL at 61, 65, 66, 78, 81]; 
3. Ellsworth agreed at the time to pay the money in exchange for a 
change order on the first building constructed on the Williams Property [id at 62, 
67,81]; 
4. The Williams Property was never developed [id at 81]; 
5. In February 2001, after Ellsworth prepared a change order on 
Building I of 51-SPR's property, Hatch told Ellsworth that the change order has to 
be on Building II [id at 62]; 
6. Ellsworth prepared a change order on Building II of 51-SPR's 
property for the $78,000, which Hatch signed [id. at 62; Def. Ex. 26]; and 
7. Hatch indicated that if Building III did not become a reality, the 
change order would apply to Building II [Tr. 8466 at 83-84]. 
In sum, there was no evidence that Hatch directed EPCO to file the improper mechanics' 
lien. The trial court could not infer such a fact from Hatch's mere authorization of a 
change order on the Building II Contract. This finding is clearly erroneous and should be 
vacated. In any event, the finding that Hatch, the developer, instructed EPCO to file the 
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lien claim is immaterial to section 38-1-25. It is no defense under this statute that the 
developer instructed the contractor to file a lien. 
2. The Findings Regarding EPCO's "Good Faith" in Filing the 
Lien Are Clearly Erroneous and Immaterial (Findings 23 and 
251-
The trial court relied in part on a finding that EPCO "acted in good faith" when 
EPCO intentionally included the $78,000 claim in its mechanics' lien, "not knowing" 
whether the $78,000 payment benefited 51-SPR's property. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law ^j 23, 25 (Add. I). The only evidence to be marshaled in support of 
this finding is the same as set forth in Point IV(C)(1), above—none of which is legally 
sufficient to make a finding of good faith. The fact that Hatch signed a change order on 
Building II does not show EPCO's good faith because EPCO had no authority 
whatsoever to file a mechanics' lien against the property for the $78,000. See Point 
IV(A), above. A lien can only be recorded against property that was improved, 
regardless of what agreement the parties may have reached. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-
3 (2001). 
Moreover, the trial court's related, tacit suggestion that Ellsworth may have 
believed at the time that the money was for work on 51-SPR's Northshore Property has 
no evidentiary support at all. The payment took place long before the development of 51-
SPR's property began. [Tr. 8466 at 78-80.] Further, Ellsworth's only testimony about 
what he believed the money was for is that he "assumed" it was for work performed on 
the Williams Property. [Id. at 61, 65, 66, 78, 81.] The trial court could not infer from 
this evidence that EPCO "believed" that the money benefited 51-SPR's property. The 
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findings in paragraphs 23 and 25 regarding Ellsworth's state of mind are clearly 
erroneous and should be vacated. 
In any event, even if there were evidence in the record that EPCO believed it was 
entitled to file the lien for $78,000, there is no "good faith" defense under the statute for 
those who are ignorant of the legal implications of their improper liens. EPCO's defense 
to the abusive lien claim is akin to that raised by the lender in Rossberg v. Holesapple, 
who accepted a usurious loan payment, only to claim that he lacked the specific intent to 
violate the usury law and did not understand what constituted usury. 260 P.2d 563, 566, 
123 Utah 544, 549 (1953). The Supreme Court held that even if the facts were as the 
lender alleged, the lender was liable because the necessary intent to "constitute usury is 
simply the intent to take and reserve more than permitted by law for the loan" and 
"[ijgnorance of the law excuses no one, not even an honest money lender." Id (internal 
quotation and citation omitted). 
Likewise, all that matters here is that EPCO intentionally filed a lien that included 
a $78,000 claim for which EPCO had no right to claim a lien. See Point IV(B), above. 
As a result, judgment on the abusive lien claim was appropriate regardless of EPCO's 
alleged "good faith." 
3. The Finding That EPCO Lacked Intent Is Clearly Erroneous 
and Immaterial (Findings 24 and 25). 
In denying 51-SPR's claim under the abusive lien statute, the trial court found that 
in filing its lien, EPCO did not "intend" to exact "more than it believed was due" from 
51-SPR. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ^[ 24, 25 (Add. I). However, the 
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statute does not condition liability on a lien claimant's subjective belief whether it is 
seeking more than is due. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25; see also Point IV(C)(2), 
above. Nor does the statute require a showing that the contractor specifically "intend" to 
exact more than is due. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25. 
This part of the trial court's ruling poses an issue of first impression in Utah, 
namely whether the intent requirement in the statute refers to the act of causing the lien to 
be filed, or whether as the trial court's ruling implicitly suggests, there must also be a 
specific intent to exact more than is due. Based on the plain language of the statute, the 
"intent" requirement is satisfied by simply showing that the contractor "intentionally 
causes a claim of lien against any property." Id. As with the usury statute analyzed by 
the Supreme Court in Holesapple (see Subpart 2, above), section 38-1-25 imposes no 
duty on the owner to show specific intent to violate the abusive lien statute. 
Juxtaposing an "intent" requirement within the three subparts, (a), (b), and (c) of 
1 8 
section 38-1-25(1) would render the statute impermissibly redundant. This is because 
subpart (a) also includes the words "with the intent." IcL § 38-l-25(l)(a) ("with the intent 
to cloud the title"). If the word "intentionally" in the statute were a modifier of the three 
subparts, then "intent" would be redundant and superfluous because "intentionally" and 
"with intent" mean the same thing. 
16
 See State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 278 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("'Whenever 
possible, statutes should be construed so that no portion is superfluous,' and, as such, 
they should not be read to include a pure redundancy.") (quoting Beynon v. St. George-
Dixie Lodge # 1743, B.P.O.E., 854 P.2d 513, 518 n.21 (Utah 1993)). 
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The only way to prevent such a redundancy is to construe "intentionally" in 
subsection (1) simply as a modifier of the language that immediately follows—"causes a 
claim of lien against any property." Id § 38-1-25(1). Such a construction serves the 
policies recognized in Pochynok and Whipple, discussed in Point IV(B), above, of 
discouraging contractors from filing overstated liens. It was 51-SPR's burden to prove 
that EPCO intentionally filed its lien, the lien contained a greater demand than the sum 
due, and the lien sought to exact from 51-SPR by means of the excessive claim of lien 
more than is due. As discussed in Point IV(B), above, 51-SPR satisfied its burden. 
Since the trial court read an intent requirement into the subparts of section 38-1-
25(1) that does not exist, the trial court's finding that EPCO did not "intend" to exact 
"more than it believed was due" (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ^} 24, 25 
(Add. I)) is immaterial and should not have precluded judgment against EPCO on the 
abusive lien claim under section 38-l-25(l)(b). 
However, even if some degree of intent can be read into subpart (l)(b) of the 
statute, the trial court's finding that there was no such intent is clearly erroneous. 
Marshaling the evidence supporting a finding of "no intent" is to prove a negative. 
EPCO never provided any testimony that it did not intend to exact more than was due 
from 51-SPR. Instead, the only evidence related to EPCO's intent was that EPCO knew 
that the $78,000 payment was for the Williams Property for work done by Hubble 
Engineering, not EPCO, but that EPCO still intended to include this sum in its 
mechanics' lien against 51-SPR's property and exact this amount from 51-SPR. See 
Point IV(A)-(B), above. Based on these uncontroverted facts, the trial court should have 
42 
found that EPCO intended to exact from 51-SPR more than was due, even if such a 
statutory requirement existed. In sum, the finding of fact to the contrary was clearly 
erroneous and should be vacated. 
4. The Trial Court Clearly Erred in Finding That Hatch Owned 
the Property (Findings 2 and 25). 
The trial court found that Hatch is "the primary principal and owner of the 
property for Buildings I and II." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law f^ 2 (Add. I); 
see also id^ [^ 25 (also referring to Hatch as "owner"). However, there was no such 
evidence at trial. Rather, the uncontroverted evidence at trial was that except for one day 
when Broadstone was deeded the property so it could secure construction financing in 
Broadstone's name, title to the Property has been vested in 51-SPR. [Tr. 8467 at 379-
80.] Moreover, it was established that in August or September 2001, any interest Hatch 
or Broadstone had in the project was entirely relinquished to 51-SPR. [Id at 386.] The 
finding that Hatch was the owner is clearly erroneous. In any event, as discussed in Part 
B, above, EPCO had no right to claim a lien on the property anyway since it had provided 
no improvements whatsoever. Hatch's ownership is immaterial. 
5. The Trial Court Clearly Erred in Finding That the $78,000 Was 
Paid to "Hatch and Broadstone" (Finding 22). 
The trial court also confused the facts when it found that the $78,000 "was paid by 
EPCO to Hatch and Broadstone." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law j^ 22 (Add. 
I). This finding is clearly erroneous because Ellsworth admitted that it was Vintage that 
invoiced EPCO for this amount and Vintage whom EPCO then paid. [Def. Ex. 28; Tr. 
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8466 at 63-64.] In all events, this finding is immaterial because whomever EPCO paid, 
EPCO had no right to lien the Property as a result of having made this payment. 
6. The Trial Court Clearly Erred in Finding That Ellsworth 
Assumed the $78,000 Was "Possibly for Building I F and That 
the Rendering Included Buildings I and II (Finding No. 2), 
The trial court's confusion is readily apparent in its finding that the rendering that 
Hatch provided to EPCO included "Buildings I and II on the property in question" and 
that Hatch proposed that Ellsworth pay Vintage for what Ellsworth assumed to be "costs 
for the Williams property and possibly for Building II" Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law f^ 2 (Add. I) (emphasis supplied). This finding tacitly implies that 
Ellsworth believed the costs he was paying to Vintage were for work on Building II of 
51-SPR 's property, which was not the case. Yet, there is no evidence in the trial court 
record that can be marshaled in support of this finding. 
Ellsworth was unequivocal in his testimony that the building on which he expected 
to receive a change order at the time he paid Vintage was a proposed building on the 
Williams property.19 [Tr. 8466 at 81.] While EPCO ultimately received a change order 
on 51-SPR's Property [id.], which was not developed until several months later in March 
2000 [Tr. 8466 at 64, 79-80; Def. Ex. 28], Ellsworth reiterated that he assumed EPCO's 
payment was for the Williams property [id. at 61, 65, 66, 78]. 
This testimony also clarifies the trial court's Finding No. 3 that Hatch instructed 
Ellsworth that a change order could be applied on Building II for $78,000. See Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 4 j^ 3 (Add. I). This statement was made well after 
EPCO paid Vintage. When EPCO paid the money to Vintage, it expected a change order 
on the Williams Property, and only received a change order on Building II because the 
Williams Property was not developed. [Tr. 8466 at 81.] 
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The trial court's confusion may derive from the fact that the proposed "North 
Shore" rendering on the Williams Property, which EPCO received before paying Vintage 
in August 1999, referred to buildings as "Building #1," "Building #2," etc. [Tr. 8466 at 
60, 65, 73; Def. Ex. 62.] But again, the rendering was for the Williams Property—not 
51-SPR's property [id.], and as the architect Mark Wilson testified, such renderings are 
not interchangeable between properties [Tr. 8466 at 271-72]. The trial court's finding 
that Ellsworth assumed his payment was for Building II and that the rendering he was 
shown was for 51-SPR's property is clearly erroneous and should be vacated. 
V. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO EPCO SHOULD BE 
REVERSED, 
A, The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Attorney Fees for 
Noncompensable Claims. 
Even assuming all of the trial court's other legal rulings were correct, the 
trial court still erred when it awarded all of EPCO's attorney fees, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law at 17-18 ^j 45-47 (Add. I), notwithstanding EPCO's lack of success 
on several claims and EPCO's failure to allocate its fees among compensable and 
noncompensable claims. "Utah adheres to the well-established rule that attorney fees 
generally cannot be recovered unless provided for by statute or by contract." Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 419 (Utah 1989). Moreover, a party claiming 
fees must "allocate its request for fees according to its underlying claim[s]." A.K. & R. 
While the Hubble rendering and Vintage invoice referenced "Northshore" [Def. 
Exs. 28, 62], those references were to the proposed Williams Property development [Tr. 
8466 at 33-34, 65, 73, 80-81], and not to 51-SPR's property, which Hatch initially 
intended to develop under the name "Northshore" [Id. at 34]. 
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Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const., 1999 UT App 87, t 32, 977 P.2d 518. 
Specifically, the party must "differentiate between the fees and time expended for '(1) 
successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful 
claims for which there would have been an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims 
been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement for attorney fees.'" Id. 
(quoting Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992)).21 This fee 
allocation requirement "also obligates the trial court to make findings which closely 
resemble the requesting party's allocation of fees on each claim." Id ; see also Foote v. 
Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998) ("Where the parties evidentiary submissions in 
support of a request for attorney fees are deficient, so will be the court's evaluation of 
those fees."). 
Here, EPCO brought numerous claims, three of which involved a statutory basis 
for fees—mechanics' lien foreclosure, failure to obtain a bond, and withholding of 
retention proceeds —and several others that lacked a basis for attorney fees—breach of 
contract, quantum meruit, fraudulent transfer, misrepresentation, and tortious 
interference. [R.8134-35.] Of these claims, EPCO prevailed only on the mechanics' lien 
21
 See also Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App 109, H 15, 978 P.2d 
470 (holding that one seeking attorneys' fees "must reasonably allocate time incurred 
between compensable and non-compensable claims"). 
22
 See Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-18(1), (mechanics' lien statute), 14-2-2(3) 
(payment bond statute), 13-8-5(10) (withheld retention proceeds statute). 51-SPR is 
entitled to attorney fees incurred in connection with claims on which 51-SPR prevailed, 
including the retention and payment bond claims. 
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and breach of contract claims. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 19 ^ f 1 
(Add. I). 
Yet, besides removing some (but not all) of its fees relating to the payment bond 
claim on which 51-SPR prevailed,23 EPCO failed to separate its attorney fees among 
these multiple claims. The affidavit does not separate fees incurred in prosecuting the 
claims on which EPCO did not prevail (failure to obtain a bond, withholding of retention 
proceeds, quantum meruit, fraudulent transfer, misrepresentation, and tortious 
interference), and does not separately allocate the fees incurred on the contract claim and 
mechanics' lien claim. [R.8302 ffif 11-12; R.8134-35.] Instead, EPCO makes the 
conclusory statement that all of its claims are "directly or indirectly related" to its lien 
claims. [R.8302 f^ 12.] This, of course, is not what Utah law requires. 
Even if EPCO is the prevailing party under the mechanics' lien statute, EPCO was 
not entitled to recover fees for prevailing on the breach of contract claim, for which there 
was no contractual attorney fee provision. [Def. Exs. 3, 4; R.8134-35, 8316.] The same 
was true in American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Comm. Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 192 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), in which there was no applicable provision for attorney fees in the 
parties' construction contract. This Court held that while the lien claimant prevailed on 
the mechanics' lien foreclosure claim, it was "not entitled under section 38-1-18 to 
attorney fees incurred in pursuing its nonlien claims which were 'completely separate' 
See R.8302 ^|j 11-12 (purportedly removing payment-bond-claim-related fees). 
But see, e.g., R.8229 (billing $1,564.00 for "[w]ork[ing] for entire day and into the night 
researching and writing renewed motion for summary judgment on the failure to obtain a 
bond claim"). 
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from the lien claims." Id at 193. The Court should reverse the award of attorney fees 
with instructions to remand for a proper allocation among EPCO's various claims. 
B. The $78,000 Abusive Lien Bars Any Fee Award to EPCO. 
In the event 51-SPR prevails on the abusive lien claim on appeal, the entire award 
of attorney fees to EPCO must be vacated because an abusive lien is an absolute bar to 
recovery of attorney fees on a mechanics' lien foreclosure claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 
38-1-18(2). The inequity of EPCO's abusive lien and accompanying fees claim is 
precisely what section 38-1-18(2) was intended to prevent.2 
C. After the Appeal, Remand Will Be Necessary to Reassess Whether 51-
SPR or EPCO is the Prevailing Party. 
Depending on the outcome of the issues raised by this appeal, the Court will likely 
need to vacate the trial court's award of attorney fees and remand so that the trial court 
can reassess who the prevailing party is on the one compensable claim on which EPCO 
prevailed—its mechanics' lien claim. Utah courts apply a "flexible and reasoned 
approach" to determining which party is the "successful party" for purposes of awarding 
attorney fees under the mechanics' lien statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1). Whipple, 
2004 UT 47, Tf 26, 94 P.3d 270. This "common sense" approach requires "not only 
This Court found "instructive" a note proposing the amendment and speaking to 
the bill's intent, which stated: 
In my view, the primary inequity in the mechanics' lien law as it currently 
operates is that a party can assert a claim for much more than he or she is 
legitimately owed forcing a defendant to litigate the claim, and yet still be 
entitled to attorney[] fees as the "prevailing party" even if the lien claimant 
only recovers a fraction of what was originally claimed. 
Pochynok, 2003 UT App 375 at Tf 18. 
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consideration of the significance of the net judgment in the case, but also 'looking at the 
amounts actually sought and then balancing them proportionally with what was 
recovered.'" Id. (quoting A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2002 UT 
App 73, U 19, 47 P.3d 92). Since the trial court is in the best position to make this 
analysis, see id at f^ 26, remand is necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Appellant 51-SPR-L.L.C. respectfully requests that 
this Court enter an Order (1) reversing the judgment on EPCO's contract claim based on 
the trial court's erroneous ruling on the joint venture issue; (2) reversing the judgment on 
EPCO's mechanics' lien claim and remand for trial on the timeliness of EPCO's lien; (3) 
remanding for application of the lien waivers and assessment of 51-SPR's damages under 
the warranty, guaranty, and indemnity provisions; (4) reversing the dismissal of 51-SPR's 
joint venture claim; and (5) reversing the award of attorney fees and remanding for a 
proper allocation of fees. Moreover, to the extent 51-SPR prevails on any of the issues 
raised by this appeal, 51-SPR requests the attorney fees incurred on appeal and a remand 
for a reassessment of who is the prevailing party entitled to attorney fees. 
s i -
DATED this 2 1 day of January, 2005. 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P,C. 
R. Stephen Marshall V_J 
Erik A. Olson 
Attorneys for Appellant 51-SPR-L.L.C. 
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A. Determinative Provisions 
1. Utah Code Ann. §§38-1-3,-7,-18, -25 (2001) (mechanics' lien act) 
2. Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-1-3.1(1), -4(2) (2002) (partnership act) 
B. Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment Against 51-SPR on Issue of 
Liability as Joint Venturer With and Partner of Broadstone (Jan. 4, 2003) 
("Joint Venture Order") [R.3619-30] 
C. Ruling (April 7, 2003) [R.5446-55] 
D. Findings and Order at 6 (June 6, 2003) [R.6062-69] 
E. Order Granting EPCO's Motion to Reconsider on the Timeliness of the 
Mechanics' Liens (July 9, 2003) ("Lien Timeliness Order") [R.6305-07] 
F. Order Denying 51 -SPR's Motion to Reconsider the Rulings on the Timeliness 
of Building I Liens at 2 (July 9, 2003) [R.6301-02] 
G. Order Granting EPCO's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Indemnities 
(Dec. 31, 2003) ("Indemnity Order") [R.8113-15] 
H. Order on EPCO's Failure to Obtain a Bond Claim (Feb. 9, 2004) [R.8199-
8201] 
I. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (May 18, 2004) [R.8428-47] 
J. Judgment (May 19, 2004) [R.8448-49] 
K. Addendum No. 2 to Real Estate Purchase Contract Between Broadstone 
Investments, LLC and 51 South Portland Realty Corp. Dated June 15, 2000 
("Addendum No. 2") (Def. Ex. 56) 
L. Central Bank Lien Waiver - Sample (from Def. Ex. 15) 
Tab A 
Those entitled to lien—What may be attached 
Utah Code § 38-1-3 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 38. LIENS 
CHAPTER 1. MECHANICS' LIENS 
Current through End of 2003 2nd Sp Sess 
§ 38-1-3. Those entitled to lien—What may be attached 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing or 
renting any materials or equipment used m the construction, alteration, or improvement of any 
building or structure or improvement to any premises m any manner and licensed architects and 
engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, 
estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional 
service, or bestowed labor, shall have a hen upon the property upon or concerning which they 
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or equipment for the 
value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by 
each respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his 
authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise except as the hen is barred under Section 38-11-107 
of the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. This hen shall attach only to 
such interest as the owner may have in the property. 
As last amended by Chapter 308, Laws of Utah 1994 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
Notice of claim—Contents—Recording—Service on owner of property-
Utah Code § 38-1-7 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
WESTS UTAH CODE 
TITLE 38. LIENS 
CHAPTER 1. MECHANICS' LIENS 
Current through End of 2003 2nd Sp Sess 
§ 38-1-7. Notice of claim—Contents—Recording—Service on owner of property. 
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for record w th the county recorder 
of the county m which the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to 
hold and claim a lien withm 90 days from the date: 
(a) the person last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or material on a 
project or improvement for a residence as defined in Section 38-11-102; or 
(b) of final completion of an original contract not involving a residence as defined m Section 
38-11-102. 
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1), shall contain a statement setting forth: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom the hen claimant was employed or to whom the hen 
claimant furnished the equipment or material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the first and last 
equipment or material was furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; 
(e) the name, current address, and current phone number of the hen claimant; 
(f) the signature of the hen claimant or the lien claimant's authorized agent; 
(g) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of 
Documents, and 
(h) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, a statement 
describing what steps an owner, as defined m Section 38-11-102, may take to require a hen 
claimant to remove the hen in accordance with Section 38-11-107 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), an acknowledgment or certificate is not required for any 
notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989. 
(4) (a) Withm 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the hen claimant shall deliver or mail by 
certified mail a copy of the notice of hen to 
(l) the reputed owner of the real property; or 
(n) the record owner of the real property. 
(b) If the record owner's current address is not readily available to the hen claimant, the copy 
of the claim may be mailed to the last-known address of the record owner, using the names and 
addresses appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of the county where the 
affected property is located. 
(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of hen to the reputed owner or record owner precludes 
the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed owner or record 
owner m an action to enforce the hen. 
(5) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall make rules governing the 
form of the statement required under Subsection (2)(h). 
Amended by Laws 1994, c 308, Laws 1995, c 172, § 1, eff May 1, 1995, Laws 1998, c 49, § 1, eff July 1, 1998, 
Laws 1999, c 223, § 1, eff May 3, 1999 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
Attorneys' fees—Offer of judgment. 
Utah Code § 38-1-18 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 38. LIENS 
CHAPTER 1. MECHANICS1 LIENS 
Current through End of 2003 2nd Sp. Sess. 
§ 38-1-18. Attorneys' fees—Offer of judgment 
(1) Except as provided in Section 38-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action brought to 
enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
(2) A person who files a wrongful lien as provided in Section 38-1-25 is not entitled to 
recover attorneys' fees under Subsection (1). 
(3) A party against whom any action is brought to enforce a lien under this chapter may make 
an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If the offer is not 
accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the 
offeree shall pay the costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the offeror after the offer was made. 
Amended by Laws 1961, c. 76; Laws 1995, c. 172, § 4, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 2001, c. 257, § 1, eff April 30, 2001. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
Abuse of lien right—Penalty. 
Utah Code § 38-1-25 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
WESTfS UTAH CODE 
TITLE 38, LIENS 
CHAPTER 1. MECHANICS' LIENS 
Current through End of 2003 2nd Sp. Sess. 
§ 38-1-25. Abuse of lien right—Penalty. 
(1) Any person entitled to record or file a lien under Section 38-1-3 is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor who intentionally causes a claim of lien against any property, which contains a 
greater demand than the sum due to be recorded or filed: 
(a) with the intent to cloud the title; 
(b) to exact from the owner or person liable by means of the excessive claim of lien more 
than is due; or 
(c) to procure any unjustified advantage or benefit. 
(2) In addition to any criminal penalties under Subsection (1), a person who violates 
Subsection (1) is liable to the owner of the property or an original contractor or subcontractor 
who is affected by the hen for the greater of: 
(a) twice the amount by which the wrongful hen exceeds the amount actually due; or 
(b) the actual damages incurred by the owner of the property. 
Amended by Laws 1997, c 125, § 1, eff May 5, 1997, Laws 2001, c 257, § 2, eff April 30, 2001 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
Tab 2 
Joint venture defined—Application of chapter 
Utah Code § 48-1-3.1 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
WESTS UTAH CODE 
TITLE 48. PARTNERSHIP 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL AND LIMITED LIABILITY 
PARTNERSHIPS 
PART 1. GENERAL PARTNERSHIP 
Current through End of 2003 2nd Sp. Sess. 
§ 48-1-3.1. Joint venture defined—Application of chapter 
(1) A joint venture is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a 
single business enterprise. 
(2) This chapter governs the property and transfer rights of joint ventures. 
As enacted by Chapter 14, Laws of Utah 1985. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
Rules for determining the existence of a partnership 
Utah Code § 48-1-4 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 48. PARTNERSHIP 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL AND LIMITED LIABILITY 
PARTNERSHIPS 
PART 1. GENERAL PARTNERSHIP 
Current through End of 2003 2nd Sp Sess 
§ 48-1-4. Rules for determining the existence of a partnership 
In determining whether a partnership exists these rules shall apply: 
(1) Except as provided by section 48-1-13, persons who are not partners as to each other are 
not partners as to third persons. 
(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy m common, tenancy by entireties, joint property, common 
property, or part ownership does not of itself establish a partnership, whether such co-owners do 
or do not share any profits made by the use of the property. 
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the 
persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any properly from which the 
returns are derived 
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie evidence that 
he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such pi ofits were received 
m payment: 
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise. 
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord. 
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner. 
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amounts of payment vary with the profits of the business. 
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the good will of a business or other property by 
installments or otherwise 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
TabB 
"VcD 
Mark L. Poulsen (5424) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, 
DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
Fax: (801) 576-1960 
Fciir" •*ct Court 
.e. :>? Utah 
l-4-O^l 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and 
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah 
limited liability company; CENTRAL BANK, a 
Utah banking corporation; 51-SPR-L.L.C, a 
Utah limited liability company; ALLSTATE 
ELECTRIC, a Utah corporation; HUBS TILE, 
INC., a Utah corporation; WESTWOOD MILL 
& CABINET, INC., a Utah corporation; 
DEBRA A. BURNETT and MICHAEL L. 
BURNETT, dba ALARM TECH; 
HALVERSON MECHANICAL, INC., a Utah 
coiporation; MASCO CONTRACTOR 
SERVICES CENTRAL, INC., a Utah 
coiporation dba HANSEN-ALL SEASONS 
INSULATION; DECORATIVE 
LANDSCAPING, INC., a Utah corporation; the 
DAN PARKINSON FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP; Guy HATCH, an individual; 
JOHN DOES 1-20 and all other persons 
unknown claiming any interest to the subject 
real property, 
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST 51-SPR ON ISSUE OF 
LIABILITY AS JOINT 
VENTURER WITH AND 
PARTNER OF BROADSTONE 
Civil No. 020400442 
Civil No. 010405059 
Consolidated into 
Civil No. 010405059 
Judge Schofield 
Defendants. 
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ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT to Ellsworth Paulsen 
Construction Company on the issue of 51-SPR LLC's liability as joint venturer, partner or successor 
in relation to Broadstone Investments, LC based upon a ruling by the Court dated December 30, 
2002. 
This case is before the court on Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Service's ("EPCO") May 24, 
2002 motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of defendant 51-SPR-LLC's ("51-SPR" or 
"Chimento") liability as a joint venturer, partner, or successor in relation to Broadstone Investments, 
LC ("Broadstone").1 51-SPR opposes the motion. 
Having reviewed the parties' respective memoranda, and the evidence on file, and heard oral 
argument on the matter, I now issue this ruling granting the motion. 
In essence, EPCO asserts that it has not been paid certain sums due for construction services 
performed on the Northshore I and II commercial real estate development project (the "Project") 
pursuant to contracts and related change orders signed by Broadstone or its agents. If Broadstone 
and 51-SPR were partners or joint venturers on the Project, 51-SPR is jointly and severally liable for 
all debts chargeable to the partnership or joint venture, including the sums due to EPCO under the 
contracts to develop the Project. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-10 to -12; Hoth v. WJiite, 799 P.2d 213, 
218 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-1-10 tp -12). 
1
 The central issue before the court has been cast principally as one of joint venture. 
However, in footnote 2 of its supplemental supporting memorandum, counsel for EPCO correctly 
notes that "partnership law and joint venture law are essentially indistinguishable." (citing 
Nupetco Assoc, v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877, 882 fn. 3 (Utah 1983). See also Utah Code Ann § 48-
1-3.1; Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 218 (Utah App. 1990) ("[§48-1-3.1] provides that joint 
ventures are governed by the partnership act."). 
2 
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Summary Judgment Standard. 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Where the motion for summary judgment is supported by evidence and 
sworn testimony, as is the case here, the party opposing summary judgment may not rest upon mere 
allegations, but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of fact to be tried. See 
Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983). 
Whether or not there was a joint venture relationship is a factual question. Rogers v. M.O. 
Bitner, Co., 738 P.2d 1029, 1932 (Utah 1987). However, in this case, where the "facts are not in 
dispute . . . the relationship of the parties is a matter of law." Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 
1974). 
Joint Venture Factors. 
The Utah Code defines "joint venture" as "an association of two or more persons to carry on 
as co-owners of a single business enterprise." Utah Code Ann. §48-1-3.1. The Utah Supreme Court 
has declared Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 1974) to be the "leading case in Utah defining the 
elements essential to a joint venture." Betenson v. Call Auto & Equipment Sales, 645 P.2d 684,686 
(Utah 1982). Bassett states: 
A joint venture is an agreement between two or more persons 
ordinarily but not necessarily limited to a single transaction for the 
purpose of making a profit. The requirements for the relationship are 
not exactly defined, but certain elements are essential: The parties 
must combine their property, money, effects, skill, labor, and 
3 
knowledge. AS a general rule, there must be a community of interest 
in the performance of the common purpose, a joint proprietary 
interest in the subject matter, a mutual right to control, a right to share 
in the profits, and unless there is an agreement to the contrary, a duty 
to share in any losses which may be sustained. 
530 P.2d at 2-3 (footnotes omitted). In Rogers v. M.O, Bitner, the court states that "[a] joint venture 
does not always rise pursuant to formal agreement; rather, it is a relationship voluntarily entered by 
the parties and may be proven by the actions taken by the parties. The characterizations given by the 
parties are certainly not determinative of the issue." 738 P.2d 1029, 1032 (emphasis added). 
In this case both the written agreements and the parties' undisputed actions indicate that 51-
SPR was not merely Broadstone's creditor, but that 51-SPR was actively involved with Broadstone 
in the business of developing and maintaining the Project in anticipation of earning a profit. While 
Broadstone was the principal supplier of skill, labor, and knowledge as an on-site project manager, 
51-SPR was the principal supplier of capital to the venture. Both parties had a common inte4rest 
in the Project and each expected to participate in the profits expected to follow. 
Background and Addendum #2, 
In April 2000, Guy Hatch (of Broadstone) and Chimento met with Ford Motor Company 
("Ford") for the purpose of acquiring the real property upon which the Northshore I and II buildings 
were constructed. While 51-SPR insists that Hatch met with Ford before Chimento did, Chimento 
admits to being "involved in the acquisition of the property, in putting it under contract." The real 
estate purchase agreement ("RESPA") lists the purchase price of the Northshore property at 
$1,750,000.00. On June 12, 2000, Ford conveyed the Northshore property to Broadstone by 
warranty deed. 
.3627 
It is undisputed that Broadstone and 51 South Portland Realty executed Addendum #2 to the 
RESPA (the "Agreement"), labeled "DATED June 15, 2000" at the top of the document. It is also 
undisputed that all of 51 South Portland Realty's interest in the Agreement is now owned by 51-SPR 
and that the term "Chimento" in the Agreement refers to 51 South Portland Realty. 
The Agreement undisputedly provides that 1) The parties would own the Northshore property 
as tenants in common; 2) 51-SPR would contribute $2.9 million, of which $1.75 million would be 
used to acquire the land, and another $1.2 million would be applied to site work and construction 
costs; 3) Broadstone would be the "project manager," would "operate the venture," would obtain 
long term financing, enter into construction contracts, supervise construction, and obtain leases on 
the buildings; 4) Chimento would execute a mortgage to secure institutional construction financing; 
5) Chimento funds for site development and construction costs ("hard" costs only) would be utilized 
"on a standard draw schedule . . . after inspection approval by a Chimento engineer"; 6) Broadstone 
would be a single member single purpose company, whose "ownership interest and control shall be 
pledged to Chimento to secure [its] obligations"; and 7) Broadstone would "mortgage its tenancy in 
common interest to Chimento [51]SPR] to secure the pledge and restriction agreements as well [as] 
Hatch's obligations."2 
The Agreement also provides: 
[1] The parties intend that following completion of the project... but not earlier that 
1/1/2001, as they may hereafter agree, Chimento and [Broadstone] may transfer their 
interests to a new Utah LLC to be owned equally by them, otherwise consistent with 
2
 See 51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial 
summary judgment, pp. 8-9. These are the undisputed characterizations of the items in 
Addendum #2. 
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the terms of this memo, but in any event the project shall be held for investment and 
all actions by the parties shall be in furtherance of that goal. (Agreement p. 2, %4)\ 
[2] Chimento shall receive a 10% return on its capital commencing December 1, 
2000 through the end of the first year following closing . . . to be p>aid monthly . . . 
. Hatch shall guaranty such return, to be paid from operating income of the project, 
if sufficient, and if not, then from proceeds of a sale of a portion of the land . . . if 
any, [Broadstone} shall contribute any and all sums to the project needed to payment 
of such return. (Agreement p.2, ^6); 
[3] Any net operating income remaining in the first year [shall be paid] to Hatch [of 
Broadstone]. (Agreement p. 2, fl)-9 
[4] Chimento shall have the option to receive a 10% return on its capital for a second 
year on terms set forth above for year 1, or to share 50/50 in net operating income of 
the project. . . (Agreement p. 2, ^8); 
[5] Thereafter Chimento and [Broadstone] shall share 50/50 in net operating income 
of the project. (Agreement p. 2,16); 
[6] Permanent financing will "take out" all financed construction costs... the project 
. . . will secure the same . . . . The parties agree to consult as to the amount of 
permanent financing which may exceed the above and, if agreed, such excess to be 
applied as follows: to Chimento to reimburse the following order as available, (i) 
land closing costs; (ii) allocated construction costs, i.e. building 1 and building 2; (iii) 
allocated site improvement costs, i.e. building 1 and building 2; and after Chimento 
capital repaid in full, to each 50/50. (Agreement p.2, [^10; 
[7] Subsequent capital transactions (refinances, sales, casualty or condemnation) after 
debt repayment to: (i) remaining unpaid Chimento capital; and thereafter (ii) to each 
50/50. (Agreement p. 3, <[1); 
[8] All decisions regarding the project shall be mutually made after consultation. 
(Agreement p. 3, <P); 
[9] Monthly construction and leasing reports to be submitted by Haich. (Agreement 
p. 3,14); and 
[10] Hatch development entity (not Utah LLC) shall enter into a consulting 
agreement with Chimentos, individually, with regard to property development 
inclusive of the project, to a term running through March 1, 2001, for a fee of 
6 
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$24,000.00 per month payable monthly commencing July 1, 2000 (except the July 
1 2000 payment shall be $12,000.00. (Agreement p. 3, f9). 
Joint proprietary interest in the subject matter. 
While joint tenancy alone does not of itself create a joint venture or partnership,351-SPR's 
proprietary interests in the Project severely undermines its assertions that it was merely a "creditor" 
or "investor" on the Project. 51-SPR does not dispute that both parties had ownership interests in 
the Project, at the outset.4 And since December 13, 2000, 51-SPR has owned the property in fee 
simple except for one day.5 It is undisputed that as of November, 2002, "[t]he Northshore building 
II is 100% occupied, and the Northshore Building I is approximately 70% occupied [and] 51-SPR 
receives about $70,000 per month for tenants, but pays $20,000 or $30,000 to the bank to debt 
service the construction loan."6 
Mutual right to control. 
3
 Utah Code Ann. §48-1-4. 
4
 According to counsel for 51-SPR, "Mr Chimento testified that, after discovering 
Broadstone and Hatch's misappropriation, breach of duty, and fraud, he believed that 
Broadstone's interest in the property should be surrendered to 50-SPR." 51-SPR's response to 
EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial summary judgment, p. 15. However, 
"the surrender of Broadstone's interest in the Property has been called into question by Dan 
Parkinson." Id. (citing Chimento Aff. at 125). I note that regardless of the current ownership 
status of the property (at worst 51-SPR retains a one-half interest), the undisputed facts satisfy 
the "joint proprietary interest" factor in determining joint venture status. 
5
 51-SPR does not dispute that at the end of January, 2001, it conveyed the property to 
Broadstone and Broadstone reconveyed the Property to 50-SPR the next day. 51-SPR's response 
to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial summary judgment, p. 12. 
6
 Id., p. 16,111. (citing Chimento Dep. P. 125-26). 
7 
As an owner of the Project property, 51-SPR had the right to control the activities relating 
to the Project. Nothing in the parties' Agreement abrogated 51-SPR's right to control, but only 
insured that right. While Broadstone had authority to obtain long term financing, enter into 
construction contracts, supervise construction, and obtain leases on the buildings, it was required to 
"pledge" its "ownership interest and control . . . to Chimento" (Agreement p. 2, <J[1) (emphasis 
added).7 Significantly, the Agreement provided: "All decisions regarding the project shall be 
mutually made after consultation." (Agreement p. 3, f 3) (emphasis added). 
51-SPR asserts that Chimento rarely visited the construction site, and did not actually 
"approve" construction draws, and that he did not believe he had veto power over the tenants on his 
property. Even if these assertions are true, the degree of control actually exercised by 51-SPR is not 
determinative of the control factor. The terms of the Agreement, together wnth 51-SPR's ownership 
of the property, unquestionably gave 51-SPR the right to exercise mutual control on "all decisions 
regarding the project." 
In addition, 51-SPR had the right to receive monthly reports from Broadstone under the 
Agreement. It is undisputed that Chimento visited the construction site at least six times, and 
reviewed leases and construction draws to "keep abreast of the management" of the Project.8 Given 
both the terms of the Agreement and the actual control9 exerted by 51-SPR in this case, I simply 
7
 This suggests that Broadstone was an agent for 51-SPR. 
8
 51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial 
summary judgment, p. 24. 
9
 Counsel for 51-SPR admits that when 51-SPR "discovered Broadstone's fraud" it then 
"executed the Termination of Co-Ownership Agreement" and now collects monthly rents on the 
8 
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cannot credit 51-SPR's conclusory allegation that Broadstone "had sole responsibility and authority 
to develop and manage the Property."10 
Right to share in the profits. 
Utah law provides: "the receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima 
facie evidence that he is a partner in the business," Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-4(4). While I do not 
address whether "profits" were actually received in this case, the Agreement gave both parties the 
right to share in the profits from the Project. The Agreement provided that 51-SPR would receive 
a monthly 10% "return on its capital" to be guaranteed by Broadstone. Any net operating income 
remaining in the first year would go to Broadstone. The second year, 51-SPR would have the option 
to receive a 10% "return on its capital" or to share 50/50 in net operating income of the project. 
Thereafter the parties were "to share 50/50 in net operating income of the project." (Agreement p. 
2, %8) (emphasis added). Mr. Chimento himself, acknowledged the 50/50 arrangement in his 
deposition.11 
A duty to share in any losses which may be sustained. 
51-SPR argues that it "never agreed to share in any losses incurred by Broadstone," but that 
it "merely agreed to serve as an investor or financier in the development of the Property."12 Mr. 
property. 
10
 51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial 
summary judgment, p. 24. 
11
 Chimento Dep. pp. 137-138. 
12
 51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial 
summary judgment, p. 20. 
9 
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Chimento's affidavit sates: "51-SPR was not liable or responsible for any losses, liabilities, or 
responsibilities relating to the Property, and under its arrangement with Broadstone, stood to lose 
only its investment in the Property and nothing more."13 While these bald assertions contradict 
EPCO's position, they do not create any genuine issue of material fact. 51-SPR's denials of liability 
are simply conclusory allegations which are sharply contradicted by both the terms of the Agreement 
and the undisputed facts. 
The terms of the Agreement, 51-SPR's ownership interest in the Project, and 51-SPR's 
undisputed actions all gave rise to 51-SPR's duty to share in any losses which may be sustained by 
the Project. There is no indication from the facts that the parties expected the Project to be anything 
less than profitable, thus it is no surprise that loss-sharing duties were not spelled out in detail. 
However, the Agreement essentially put 51-SPR's $2.9 million immediately at risk should the 
venture completely fail. In addition, the Agreement made 51-SPR one-half owner14 of a tenancy in 
common with all the accompanying liabilities of a real property owner, including applicable tax and 
tort liabilities. The Agreement did not purport to limit Chimento's duty to share losses by providing 
that "Chimento will execute mortgage as to its tenancy in common interest to secure institutional 
construction financing but will not be obligated on any Note or by way of guarantee at any time." 
13
 Chimento affidavit, 1 10. 
14
 In addition, by its terms, the Agreement required that Broadstone's "ownership interest 
and control shall be pledged to Chimento to secure [its] and Hatch's obligations," and that 
"[Broadstone] shall mortgage its tenancy in common interest to Chimento . . ." (Agreement, p. 2 
TI1-2). 
10 
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(Agreement, p. 1, f 1) (emphasis added).15 However, 51-SPR apparently ignored or waived this 
provision when it agreed with Central Bank in April, 2002 to guarantee "Broadstone's" #4.3 million 
construction loans. 
Simply put, the Agreement and the undisputed facts demonstrate that this is not a case of 51-
SPR acting as a simple creditor to Broadstone. 51-SPR insists that it only guaranteed Broadstone's 
loans to avoid foreclosure. One may wonder, however, whether foreclosure would have been so 
great a concern if, as it alleges, 51-SPR was merely a secured creditor in a priority position. In fact, 
however, 51-SPR voluntarily conveyed the Project property to Broadstone for one day in January 
2001 so that Broadstone could secure additional financing for the Project. In doing so, 51-SPR 
voluntarily put its own property at greater risk of loss in furtherance of the joint venture. 
The parties' characterizations. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that "[t]he characterizations given by the parties 
are certainly not determinative" of the joint venture relationship. Rogers v. M.O. Bitner, 738 P.2d 
1029, 1032. Thus, it is not dispositive to the joint venture or partnership determination that the 
Agreement provided that the project would merely be "held for investment" or that the parties' tax 
returns would "reflect that the property is held as tenants-in-common interests and not as a 
partnership."16 In contrast, 51-SPR's letter written by Robert Chimento to Richard Ellsworth on 
15
 A partial limitation on 51-SPR's liability for losses would not preclude a finding of 
joint venture under the Basset factors. In making the joint venture determination, the duty to 
share losses is a factor "unless there is an agreement to the contrary." Bassett v. Baker, P.2d 
(emphasis added). 
16
 Agreement, p. 2, f 4 and p. 3, <H 7-8. 
11 
i!i 2 R / H 
October 9, 2001 is telling Mr Chimento's letter discusses the "handling" of the pioject by Guy 
Hatch and later states 
Please realize that it was never our intent to be late in our payments to anyone, and 
we certainly had good reasons to support the statements we made to you that led you 
to believe that you would be paid by now If not for the economic uncertainty 
resulting from the 9/11 attacks, our Buyer and/or our permanent financing would 
have closed by now 
(emphasis added) 
Whether these written statements create partnership by estoppel,17 they demonstrate Mr Chimento' s 
understanding of 51-SPR's joint obligation to EPCO for work performed on the Project18 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the undisputed material facts, I grant EPCO's motion for partial summary 
judgment 51-SPR is liable to EPCO as a joint venturer or partner with regard to services rendered 
pursuant to the contracts and change orders executed between Broadstone and EPCO relating to the 
Projectl9 
17
 See Utah Code Ann §48-1-13 "When a person by words spoken or written or by 
conduct represents himself to anyone as a partner he is liable to an/ such person to whom 
such representation has been made who has on the faith of such representation given credit to the 
actual or apparent partnership When a partnership liability results, he is liable as if he were 
an actual member of the partnership When no partnership liability results, he is liable jointly 
with the other persons so consenting to the representation as to incur liability, otherwise 
separately" Id 
18
 Interestingly, in the same letter, Mr Chimento suggests that "[ajnother possibility" to 
ensure EPCO's receipt of payment "is a partnership of some kind " Chimento suggests, "perhaps 
we could both make a profit " 
19
 While I believe it may be possible to conclude that 51-SPR was the pnncipal owner of 
the Project with Broadstone merely acting as its agent, I do not make that finding today Because 
I find 51-SPR liable to EPCO as a partner or joint venturer with Broadstone, I do not reach the 
12 
Dated this 4 . Day of January, 2003. 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
Judge Anthony Wj. Schofield 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
•Steve-Marstrarr-
Attorney for 51-SPRlTL.C. 
issue of successor liability at this time. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT A 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH V j 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case No. 010405059 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' and Defendants' motions for summary 
judgment. The Court having heard oral argument on March 6, 2003, having considered the 
information filed by the parties and the relevant case law and statutory provisions, and being fully 
advised, issues the following: 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
Defendant Broadstone Investments, L.C., ("Broadstone") entered into two agreements 
with the plaintiff, Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company ("Ellsworth Paulson"), under which 
Ellsworth Paulsen agreed to act as general contractor in the construction of two buildings on a 
real estate development located in American Fork, Utah known as the North Shore Project (the 
"Property"). The contract for construction of the first building was dated March 22, 2000, and 
the contract for construction of the second building was dated September 12, 2000. To fund the 
construction of the two buildings ("Building T and "Building IT'), Broadstone entered into two 
separate loan agreements with Central Bank, and Central Bank recorded a separate Deed of Trust 
for each building. 
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Ellsworth Paulsen entered into agreements with various subcontractors, including, 
Halverson Mechanical, Inc., ("Halverson"), Allstate Electric, Inc., ("Allstate"), Westwood Mill & 
Cabinet., ("Westwood"), and Masco Contractor Services, Inc., dba Hansen-All Seasons 
Insulation ("Hansen"), to provide labor and/or services for the construction of the buildings. 
During construction, Ellsworth Paulsen or Broadstone would submit periodic Draw Requests to 
Central Bank requesting payments for Ellsworth Paulsen and its subcontractors for work 
performed on the buildings. Ellsworth Paulsen or Broadstone dated each Diraw Request and 
specified on the Draw Request whether the draw was for Building I or Building II. Ellsworth 
Paulsen or Broadstone also periodically completed and submitted to Central Bank the AIA 
Document G702, an Application and Certificate for Payment ("AIA Payment Application"), 
which set forth in detail the total work completed with respect to the construction agreement, the 
amounts of approved change orders, and any payment due for the relevant time period. 
An appropriate bank officer would review each Draw Request and AIA Payment 
Application received by Central Bank and give approval before Central Bank could disperse the 
loan proceeds to Broadstone, Ellsworth Paulsen, or any subcontractors. After approval, Central 
Bank provided to Ellsworth Paulsen corresponding checks drawn on either ttie Building I loan or 
the Building II loan, as appropriate, which Ellsworth Paulsen could then distribute to its 
subcontractors. The face of each check bore the account number for the respective loan on which 
they were drawn, and above the endorser signature line on the reverse side of each check was the 
following lien release provision: 
In consideration of payment of this check, payee by negotiating this check waives, 
releases, and relinquishes all right of lien or claims payee may have up> to the date of the 
draw request described on the reverse side hereof (the "Draw Date"), upon the property 
described on the reverse side hereof (the "Property"). The payee certifies that this check 
is payment for labor and materials that were actually performed upon and furnished to the 
Property. Payee warrants and guarantees under penalty of fraud that payment in full has 
been made by payee to the suppliers of all labor and materials to the Property incurred up 
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to the Draw Date at the insistence of payee. Payee agrees to indemnify and hold harmless 
the owner of the Property and Central Bank or its assigns from any loss, claims, or 
expenses incurred by them of or rising out of any liens or claims made against the Property 
by any supplier of labor or material at the insistence of payee. This instrument shall not be 
negotiated if any of the above language has been stricken or modified by the payee or 
endorser. 
Ellsworth Paulsen, Halverson, Westwood, Allstate, and Hansen allege that they have not 
been paid for all work performed on the Property, and have filed mechanic's lien notices for the 
unpaid labor or services to the Property. Central Bank and 51-SPR-LLC ("51-SPR"), co-owner 
and joint venturer with Broadstone, argue that such liens are invalid based upon the lien waiver 
language printed on the reverse side of the Central Bank checks and the alleged untimeliness of 
the mechanic's liens. The lien holders, however, assert that the liens were filed timely and that the 
lien waiver language on the checks is ambiguous and unenforceable, and in any event, 51-SPR is 
liable for the amount owed under the liens because it failed to obtain a payment bond as required 
by statute. Summary judgment is sought on the matter by all parties. 
ANALYSIS 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Fire Insurance Exchange v. Estate of Therkelsen. 27 P.3d 555, 558 (Utah 2001) 
(citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Under this standard, the Court will review the following issues: 
whether the Plaintiffs waived their right to file mechanic's liens on the Property; whether the 
mechanic's liens were timely filed; and whether Defendant was required to obtain a payment 
bond. 
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n. LIEN WAIVERS 
51-SPR and Central Bank claim that Ellsworth Paulsen, Halverson, Westwood, and 
Allstate waived all claims and lien rights for work performed on the Property up to the time that 
they endorsed and negotiated the Central Bank checks based upon the language printed on the 
reverse side of the checks. To support their position, 51-SPR and Central Bank rely on 
Neiderhauser Builders and Development Corp. v. Campbell 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). In that case a contractor endorsed and negotiated a check on which was printed the 
following: 
In consideration of the payment of this check, the payee by endorsing, causing to be 
endorsed, stamping this check with a deposit stamp, waives, releases and relinquishes all 
right of lien or claims payee now has to date upon the premises described on the reverse 
side hereof 
The contractor in Neiderhauser argued that by endorsing and negotiating the check, he only 
released claims for the services for which payment was made by that particuhtr check. See id. at 
1194-95. However, the court held that "[t]he lien waivers unambiguously weave all lien rights 
accrued to the date of the waiver." 
In the instant case, the contractor and subcontractors argue that they only waived the right 
of lien for labor or services performed to the date of their draw request. They also contend that 
the waiver language at issue in this case is ambiguous and unenforceable. With respect to the 
effective date in which claims are barred, this Court agrees. The waiver language at issue here 
provides: "payee by negotiating this check waives, releases, and relinquishes all right of lien or 
claims payee may have up to the date of the draw request described on the reverse side hereof 
(the "Draw Date"), upon the property described on the reverse side hereof (the "Property"). 
Central Bank and 51-SPR concede that the draw date and property description was not 
always described on the reverse side of the check but maintain that the contractor and 
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subcontractors should have inquired as to the meaning of the "draw date" before negotiating the 
checks. This Court disagrees. The language "right of lien or claims payee may have up to the 
date of the draw request" implies exactly what a reasonable contractor or subcontractor would 
logically infer; the date of the draw request is the date the contractor or subcontractor requested 
the draw, not the date the check was received or cashed which could be, and was at times in this 
case, many months after the request. 
Regardless of whether the facts in Neiderhauser are similar or distinguished from the facts 
in the present case, the language at issue in Neiderhauser stated that the payee waives right of lien 
or claims payee "now has to date" upon the premises. The language at issue in this case states 
that the payee waives right of lien or claims payee may have "up to the date of the draw request". 
The distinction is significant. This Court finds that by endorsing the Central Bank checks, 
Ellsworth Paulsen, Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate may have waived their claims and lien 
rights for work performed prior to the date that their draw was requested but not for work or 
services performed subsequently. 
The contractors and subcontractors in this case performed certain labor or services to the 
Property and then requested payment for the work performed, which represented the amount 
owed as of the date the request was made. Neither the waiver language on the reverse side of the 
Central Bank checks, nor the trade custom in the construction industry, support the notion that 
the contractor or subcontractors, by accepting payment for work performed up to the date 
requested, somehow acted as an agreement to waive all claims for unpaid labor performed 
subsequent to that date. 
in. TIMELINESS OF LIENS 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(b), a notice of mechanic's lien must be filed within 90 
days from the date of final completion of an original contract or the lien is invalid. 51-SPR and 
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Central Bank claim that, according to Ellsworth Paulsen's final ALA payment application, 
Building I was 100% complete by May 31, 2001. Ellsworth Paulsen, Halverson, and Westwood's 
liens on Building I were each filed in November 2001, more than 90 days after May 31. 
However, the plaintiffs argue that work was performed on Building I subsequent to May 31, 
2001, and that the liens on both buildings were timely filed. 
While all plaintiffs do not describe the particular building, Ellsworth Paulsen claims that it 
performed work on the Property up until December 5, 2001 and its lien was filed on September 7, 
2001. Ellsworth Paulsen also asserts that it filed an amended lien on November 13, 2001, and 
November 16, 2001. In addition, after 51- SPR claimed that Ellswoth Paulsen's liens were 
defective for failing to recognize 51-SPR as the reputed owner of the Project, Ellsworth Paulsen 
filed another lien on February 21, 2002. (Ellsworth Paulsen's Second Amended Complaint for 
Foreclosure of Lien, filed April 29, 2002 p. 6). Halverson claims that it performed work on 
Building I up until September 20, 2001, and worked on Building II up until August 23, 2001. Its 
Mechanic's Lien was filed November 26, 2001. (Affidavit of Blair Halverson, filed May 28, 
2002). Westwood claims that it worked on the Project up until November 23, 2003 and filed its 
Mechanic's Lien on November 24,2001. 
Central Bank and 51-SPR concede that labor or services were perfomied on the Property 
after May 31, 2001, but claim that the work performed after May 31, 2001 was trivial and not a 
continuation of the original contract. However, Plaintiffs argue that 51-SPR's partner, 
Broadstone, insisted that certain labor and/or services be performed on the Property after May 31, 
2002 before it would pay as agreed under the contract. (Blair Halverson depo, pp. 60-64). In 
Interiors contracting. Inc. v. Smith. Halander & Smith Assocs.. 827 P.2d 963 (Utah App. 1992), a 
tenant informed the landlord that the tenant had completed improvements as agreed under 
contract. After inspection, it was determined that four minor items remained to be completed. A 
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mechanics's lien was then filed within the statutory period with respect to the four minor items 
but after the statutory period with respect to the date that the tenant informed the landlord that 
the work was complete. 
The trial court found that the lien was not timely because "the subsequent work was 
insubstantial, trivial, and could not be used to extend the statutory lien filing period." Id. at 965. 
On appeal, the court disagreed and held that a contract is not "completed" with respect to the 
statutory filing requirement until it has been accepted by the owner. Id. It stated that "the 
homeowner cannot be heard to say that this work, done at the request of his agent in order to 
complete the contract, was not a continuation of the previous work done under the same 
contract." Id. at 968. The court further stated that "[w]here a property owner will not accept 
lienable work as completed and refuses to pay for the same until satisfactory corrective work is 
done, such property owner is estopped from asserting that the contracted work had been 
completed as of an earlier date." Id. 
Considering all the information, this Court finds that the work performed on the Property 
after May 31, 2001 was not trivial; it involved a significant amount of labor and services and was 
done at the request of the owner. The time as to work completion did not run until the job was 
done as per the request of Broadstone/51 SPR. Nevertheless, with the exception of Halverson, 
who specified the date of work completion with respect to each building, and Allstate, whose 
timeliness was not disputed at the hearing, this Court cannot find from the evidence provided at 
this stage of the case that the liens were timely filed. Therefore, Halverson and Allstate's 
motions for summary judgment as to the timeliness of the liens are granted, but Ellsworth Paulsen 
and Westwood's motions for summary judgment as to this issue are denied. A date certain shall 
be set for Ellsworth Paulsen and Westwood to put on evidence regarding completion dates with 
respect to Building I and Building II. 
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IV. PAYMENT BOND 
The Utah Code requires an owner to obtain a payment bond from the general contractor 
guarantying that the contractor's suppliers and subcontractors will be paid before the owner 
enters into a contract with the contractor if the cost exceeds $2,000.00. See Utah Code Ann. § 
14-2-l(2)(a) (2001). "[A]n owner who fails to obtain a payment bond is liable to each person 
who performed labor or service or supplied equipment or materials under the contract for the 
reasonable value of the labor or service performed . . ." § 14-2-2. Section 14-2-2 also provides 
for attorneys fees to the prevailing party in an action for failure to obtain a bond. 
Under Section 14-2-1, Broadstone, as an owner, was required to obtain a payment bond 
before entering into a contract with Ellsworth Paulsen that exceeded $2,000.00. Broadstone 
failed to obtain the required bond and is therefore liable to Halverson, Westwood, Allstate, and 
Hansen for the reasonable value of the labor or service performed by them. ^ While all parties 
recognize Broadstone's liability under the statute, 51-SPR argues that it is not liable under the 
statute because Ellsworth Paulsen, the general contractor, was hired by Broadstone and not 51-
SPR. However, in the December 30, 2002 Ruling of Judge Schofield, 51-SPR was held to be an 
owner and joint venturer with Broadstone with respect to the Property, and therefore is jointly 
liable for all the liabilities incurred by Broadstone in furtherance of the joint venture. This Court 
concurs with that finding. Based on all of the evidence provided, this Court finds that 51-SPR is 
liable under the above statute as an owner and joint venturer with Broadstone and is therefore 
responsible to provide the payment bond as required by U.C. A. § 14-2-2. 
Therefore, the motions for summary judgment filed by the subcontractors in this case with 
respect to 51-SPR's obligation to obtain a bond are granted. Attorneys fees as allowed under 
U.C.A. § 14-2-2 are also granted. As to Ellsworth Paulsen's position, however, this Court has 
not received sufficient evidence to find that they are entitled to judgment as a, matter of law on the 
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payment bond issue. A date certain shall be set for the parties to put on evidence to address this 
issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, this Court grants: (1) Ellsworth Paulsen, Halverson, Westwood, 
and Allstate's motions for summary judgment with respect to the issue of lien waiver; (2) 
Halverson and Allstate's motions for summary judgment as to the timeliness of the liens, and 
attorneys fees granted; and (3) Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate's motions for summary 
judgment regarding the issue of failure to obtain a payment bond, with attorneys fees as allowed 
by statute. All other motions for summary judgment are denied. Counsel for Halverson is to 
prepare an order consistent with this ruling within twenty (20) days of the date of this ruling and 
submit it to the Court for signature. 
DATED this V day of April, 2003. 
<£Z?>\ 
o GARYD. S^TT, JUDGp %S0vpto*^2 
\ • £ 
>; 
\w 
v v x . \ 
' * J 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
(o'b'O?) 5>®$k&j 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS AND ORDER 
Case No. 010405059 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
On March 6, 2003 oral arguments were presented to the court concerning various motions 
and cross-motions for summary judgment submitted by 51-SPR LLC ("51-SPR"), Central Bank, 
Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company ("Ellsworth"), Allstate Electric, Inc. ("Allstate"), 
Westwood Mill & Cabinet, Inc. ("Westwood"), and Halverson Mechanical, Inc. ("Halverson"). 
At the hearing, 51-SPR was represented by R. Stephen Marshall and Erik A. Olson, Central Bank 
was represented by Bruce A. Maak, Ellsworth was represented by Mark L. Poulsen, Allstate was 
represented by Conrad H Johansen, Westwood was represented by David R Nielson, and 
Halverson was represented by Dana T. Farmer. The three issues addressed were: (1) lien waivers; 
(2) timeliness of liens; and (3) failure to post a payment bond. 
After considering the arguments presented by the parties at the hearing, the information 
filed by the parties, and the relevant case law and statutory provisions, the Court issued its written 
ruling on April 7, 2003. Counsel for Halverson was to prepare an order consistent with the 
Court's ruling within 20 days from the date of the ruling. Halverson's counsel submitted its 
proposed order on May 8, 2003. 51-SPR also submitted a proposed order. Objections to 51-
V - 0 w t ; 
SPR's proposed order were filed and/or joined by Halverson, Westwood, Allstate, and Ellsworth 
51-SPR filed an objection to Halverson's proposed order After considering counsels' objections 
to the proposed orders, and finding good cause for said objections, this Court issues its own 
Findings and Order as follows 
FINDINGS 
1 51-SPR, as a joint venture with Broadstone, entered into an agreement with 
Ellsworth Paulsen to construct two commercial buildings, Northshore Building I and Northshore 
Building II, on real property located in American Fork City, Utah County, State of Utah and more 
particularly described as (the "Property") 
2 Ellsworth began work on Building I on June 23, 2000 and began work on Building 
II on September 26, 2000 
3 Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate entered into subcontract agreements with 
Ellsworth to provide materials and labor for the construction of Building I and Building II 
4 Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate entered into separate subcontracts with 
Ellsworth for each building 
5 In addition, Broadstone contracted directly with other contractors, including 
Allstate, to provide construction materials and services for the two buildings 
6. During the entire course of bidding, contracting, and construction, the 
subcontractors and Ellsworth were properly licensed contractors by the State of Utah 
7. To finance construction of Building I and Building II, Broadstone obtained a 
construction loan for each building from Central Bank 
8. After work on the project commenced, Central Bank recorded its first trust deed 
against the Amencan Fork Property upon which the buildings were to be built on January 3 1, 
2001 
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9. During the course of construction, Ellsworth or Broadstone would submit periodic 
Draw Requests to Central Bank requesting payments for Ellsworth and the subcontractors for 
work performed on the buildings. 
10. The subcontractors, Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate, prepared and submitted 
draw requests to Ellsworth, and Ellsworth prepared comprehensive payment requests which were 
submitted to Broadstone Broadstone then prepared a payment request which was submitted to 
Central Bank and Central Bank prepared checks for payment to Ellsworth and the subcontractors. 
11. Each of the checks prepared by Central Bank included language regarding the 
release of lien rights. The operative portion of the release stated: 
In consideration of payment of this check, payee by negotiating this check waives, 
releases, and relinquishes all rights of lien or claims payee may have up to the date of the 
draw request described on the reverse side hereof (the "Draw Date"), upon the Property 
described on the reverse side hereof (the "Property") 
* * * 
This instrument shall not be negotiable if any of the above language has been stricken or 
modified by the payee or endorser 
12. While it is disputed whether or not the "Draw Date" and the "Property" 
description were identified on the reverse side of any Central Bank checks, Central Bank and 51-
SPR concede that this information was not described on the reverse side of all checks. 
13. Each Central Bank check identified an "Account Number" and a "Customer 
Name" on the face of the Check 
14. Once the draws were approved, joint checks were issued by Central Bank and 
forwarded to Broadstone and Ellsworth for disbursement to the respective subcontractors. 
15. When Ellsworth presented checks to the subcontractors they were also required to 
execute an Ellsworth document entitled "Waiver of Lien" wherein it was clearly indicated which 
of the two buildings the payment was intended to apply toward and the date through which the 
waiver was to apply 
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16. On or about June 29, 2001, Central Bank issued checks to Ellsworth jointly 
payable to several of the subcontractors, including Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate. 
17. Those checks were tendered by Ellsworth and accepted by Halverson, Westwood, 
and Allstate as payments for materials and services provided to Building I. 
18. The subcontractors and Ellsworth endorsed each check and credited it as payment, 
believing the checks were payment for materials and services on Building I through the following 
dates: Halverson, February 23, 2001; Westwood, February 28, 2001; and Allstate, March 22, 
2001. 
19. These checks were the last checks received as payment on Building I. 
20. The last draw date request that was paid to the subcontractors for materials and 
services provided on Building II was for the draw requests for materials and services through the 
following dates Halverson, March 23, 2001; Westwood, no payments received; and Allstate, May 
31,2001. 
21. Subsequent draw requests from Ellsworth and the subcontractors for Building 
I and Building II have not been paid. 
22. The following work represents the last work performed on Building I: AT&T 
Sheetmetal, a subcontractor to Halverson, was working on Building I as late as September 20, 
2001; Ellsworth employees and its subcontractors were performing work on Building I in 
September and October 2001. 
23. The following represents the last work performed on Building II: Kimco Fire 
Protection, Inc., a subcontractor hired by Ellsworth to install a fire sprinkler system, provided 
work through September 6, 2001; Clayco, Inc., a subcontractor hired by Ellsworth to install 
drywall, provided work on Building II through approximately September 28, 2001; Design West 
Acoustics, a subcontractor hired by Ellsworth to install acoustical ceilings, provided work on 
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Building II through October 16, 2001; and Allstate provided work on Building II through 
October 16,2001. 
24. Because the Subcontractors and Ellsworth were not fully paid for the services and 
materials provided to Building I and/or Building II, each recorded mechanic's liens against the 
Property in the office of the Utah County recorder. 
25. Specifically, the following liens were filed against the property: Allstate Lien 
#97623:2001 filed 9/26/01; Allstate Lien #113169:2001 filed 11/2/01; Halverson Lien # 
122267:2001 filed 11/26/01; Halverson Lien #122268:2001 filed 11/26/01; Westwood Lein # 
122532:2001 filed 11/26/01; Ellsworth Lien # 117013:2001 filed 11/13/01; and Ellsworth 
Amended Lien #119260:2001 filed 11/16/01. 
26. On December 7, 2001, within 30 days after filing the lien, Halverson delivered by 
certified mail a copy of the notices of lien to Broadstone as the reputed owner of the Property, 
27. Broadstone was reputed to be the owner of the Property on Halverson's 
subcontracts with Ellsworth. 
28. Also on December 7, 2001, Robert Chimento, acting as the managing member of 
51-SPR, sent a demand to Halverson asking that Halverson remove its liens from the Property 
and acknowledging 51-SPR's possession and knowledge of Halverson's liens. 
29. A copy of Westwood's notice of lien was sent via certified mail, return receipt 
requested, to 51-SPR at the address on the latest Real Property assessment roles of Utah County. 
30 Westwood recorded a lis pendens against the Property with the Utah County 
recorder on March 15, 2003, 
31. A copy of Allstate's notices of lien were sent via certified mail, return receipt 
requested, to 51-SPR at the address on the latest Real Property assessment roles of Utah County 
as the reputed owner and were received by an agent of 51-SPR on or about September 25, 2001 
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and November 3, 2001 respectively. 
32. Allstate recorded a lis pendens against the property with the Utah County recorder 
on April 17, 2002. 
33. Ellsworth Paulsen sent a copy of the Notice of Lien filed on November 16, 2001, 
to the reputed owner of the property, Broadstone Investments via certified mail and to Robert 
Chimento of 51-SPR via certified mail. 
34. Ellsworth Paulsen filed a Notice of Lien on November 13, 2001 and filed an 
amended Notice of Lien on November 16, 2001 with the Utah County Recorder's Office. 
35. Ellsworth filed a lis pendens with the office of the Utah County recorder on April 
3, 2002. 
36. The costs of the construction, alteration, or improvement to Building I and 
Building II each exceeded $2,000.00 
37. Neither 51-SPR nor Broadstone obtained a payment bond prior to contracting for 
the improvements to the Property. 
38. 51-SPR contracted with Broadstone for the improvement of the Property. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Lien Waivers. By endorsing the Central Bank checks, Ellsworth, Halverson, 
Westwood, and Allstate waived their claims and lien rights for work performed prior to the date 
that their draws were requested, but not for work performed subsequently. The date of the draw 
request is the" date on which each such contractor or subcontractor requested the draw, not the 
date the check was received or cashed. 
2. Timeliness of Liens. The work performed on the Property after May 31, 2001, 
was not trivial It involved a significant amount of labor and services and was done at the request 
of the owner The time as to work completion did not begin to run until the job was done as per 
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the request of Broadstone and/or 51-SPR. Having sufficiently specified the date of work 
completion with respect to each building, Halverson's lien is determined to be timely filed. 
Moreover, since no dispute has been raised with respect to Allstate's lien, Allstate's lien is also 
considered to be timely. Halverson's and Allstate's motions for summary judgment as to the 
timeliness of their liens are granted. Attorney fees are also granted to Halverson and Allstate. 
The Court reserves for future determination the issue of whether the mechanic's liens of 
Westwood and Ellsworth are timely. 
3. Failure to Post a Payment Bond The motions for summary judgment of 
Halverson, Allstate, and Westwood are granted The Court concurs with the December 30, 2002 
Ruling of Judge Schofield where 51-SPR was held to be an owner and joint venturer with 
Broadstone with respect to the Property, and therefore is jointly liable for all the liabilities 
incurred by Broadstone in furtherance of the joint venture, specifically, its failure to post a 
payment bond. Attorney fees are also granted as allowed by statute. As to Ellsworth's motion 
for summary judgment, the Court has not received sufficient evidence to find that it is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on the payment bond issue and therefore denies the same. 
DATED this U day of June, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: ^ - u 
u 
GatyiyStott / 
Fourth DistricWudge 
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DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and 
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah 
limited liability company; CENTRAL BANK, 
a Utah banking corporation; 51-SPR-L.L.C, a 
Utah limited liability company; ALLSTATE 
ELECTRIC, a Utah corporation; HUBS TILE, 
INC., a Utah corporation; WESTWOOD 
MILL & CABINET, INC., a Utah corporation; 
DEBRA A. BURNETT and MICHAEL L. 
BURNETT, dba ALARM TECH; 
HALVERSON MECHANICAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation; MASCO CONTRACTOR 
SERVICES CENTRAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation dba HANSEN-ALL SEASONS 
INSULATION; DECORATIVE 
LANDSCAPING, INC., a Utah corporation; 
the DAN PARKINSON FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP; Guy HATCH, an individual; 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
THE RULING ON THE 
TIMELINESS OF THE 
MECHANIC'S LIENS 
Civil No. 010405059 
Judge Stott 
63 
After reviewing the parties briefs regarding Ellsworth Paulsen's motion to reconsider the 
ruling on timeliness of its mechanic's lien, that the mechanic's lien is timely, valid and 
enforceable, the Court grants plaintiffs motion to reconsider and rules as follows: 
FINDINGS 
1. AT&T sheetmetal, a subcontractor to Halverson, was working on Buidling I as late 
as September 20, 2001. Ellsworth employees and its subcontractors were working on Building 
I in September and October 2001. 
2. Kimco Fire Protection, Inc., a subcontractor hired by Ellsworth to install a fire 
sprinkler system, provided work through September 6, 2001; Clayco, Inc., a subcontractor 
hired by Ellsworth to install dry wall, provided work on Building II through approximately 
September 28, 2001; Design West Acoustics, a subcontractor hired by Ellsworth to install 
acoustical ceilings, provided work on Building II through October 16, 2001; and Allstate 
provided work on Building II through October 16, 2001. 
3. Ellsworth Paulsen filed a mechanic's lien against the property on November 13, 
2001 (Lien #117013:2001) and an amended lien on November 16, 2001 (Lien #119260:2001). 
4. Ellsworth Paulsen sent a copy of the Notice of Lien filed on November 16, 2001 to 
the reputed owner of the property, Broadstone Investments via certified mail and to Robert 
Chimento of 51-SPR via certified mail. 
5. Ellsworth Paulsen filed a lis pendens with the office of the Utah County recorder on 
April 3, 2002. 
2 
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BASED UPON the foregoing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the work performed on the proerty 
after May 31, 2001 was not trivial. It involved a significant amount of labor and services and 
was done at the request of the owner. The time as to work completion did not begin to run 
until the job was done as per the request of Broadstone and/or 51-SPR. Having sufficiently 
specified the date of work completion with respect to each building, Ellsworth Paulsen's lien is 
timely filed and the lien is otherwise valid and enforceable. Ellsworth Paulsen's motion for 
summary judgment as to the timeliness of its lien is granted. Attorney fees are also granted to 
Ellsworth Paulsen. 
ir *N , DATED this ^ day of * ~ T ^ ^ 2003 
Ur^/ ft ?*<& 
Judge Gary D^tott w * ' ' - r 
Fourth District Judge 
• ! 
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DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
Fax: (801) 576-1960 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and 
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ORDER DENYING 51-SPR'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
THE RULING ON THE 
TIMELINESS OF BUILDING I 
LIENS 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah 
limited liability company; CENTRAL BANK, 
a Utah banking corporation; 51-SPR-L.L.C, a 
Utah limited liability company; ALLSTATE 
ELECTRIC, a Utah corporation; HUBS TILE, 
INC., a Utah corporation; WESTWOOD 
MILL & CABINET, INC., a Utah corporation; 
DEBRA A. BURNETT and MICHAEL L. 
BURNETT, dba ALARM TECH; 
HALVERSON MECHANICAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation; MASCO CONTRACTOR 
SERVICES CENTRAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation dba HANSEN-ALL SEASONS 
INSULATION; DECORATIVE 
LANDSCAPING, INC., a Utah corporation; 
the DAN PARKINSON FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP; Guy HATCH, an individual; 
Civil No. 010405059 
Judge Stott 
Defendants. 
Based upon the briefing submitted by the parties, the Court hereby denies 51-SPR's motion 
to reconsider the ruling on the timeliness of Building I liens. 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 51-SPR's motion to reconsider the ruling 
on the timeliness of Building I liens is denied. 
DATED this °\ day of K^^AJJ^ , 2003 
u 
{wZA^^\ 
JudgeXjary p. Stott '* - \ 
Fourth Disuict Judge ^ V^^sfi^-
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Mark L. Poulsen (5424) 
Bret W. Reich (9542) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, 
DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
Fax: (801) 576-1960 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and 
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, ORDER GRANTING EPCO'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 
Plaintiff, INDEMNITIES 
vs. 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah 
limited liability company, et al. 
^ m L r l c t Court 
0 , u
"*" {STOW** 
Defendants. 
This matter comes on before the Court on the parties cross motions relating to theapplication, 
enforceability, and validity of the indemnities contained within the Central Bank lien waivers. The 
Court requested briefs on the indemnity issue. EPCO's brief was in the form of a summary 
judgment. The Court also heard oral argument on December 3, 2003 from Mark Poulsen on behalf 
of Ellsworth Paulsen and Erik Olsen and Steve Marshall for 51-SPR. The Court being fully advised 
in the premises, 
HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
Ellsworth Paulsen's motion for summary judgment to hold the indemnities inapplicable is 
granted. Because 51-SPR did not pay the contract balances, 51-SPR as joint venture partner of 
Broadstone has no damages arising from the indemnity. In addition, payment of contract balances 
is a condition precedent to any claim of indemnity. Finally, the indemnities are invalid and 
unenforceable for lack of consideration. Based on the foregoing, the indemnities are inapplicable, 
invalid and unenforceable. 
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DATED this 3 1 day otNevkstgr, 2003 
Judge Gary M Stott 
Fourth District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served, via U.S. Postage, prepaid, facsimile, or hand-
delivery, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON THE INDEMNITIES on the 
following: 
R. Stephen Marshall Sent via: 
DURHAM, JONES & PMEGAR Mail 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 Facsimile 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Hand-delivery 
Attorneys for defendant 51-SPR, L.L.C. 
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TabH 
R. Stephen Marshall (2097) 
Erik A. Olson (8479) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)415-3000 
Facsimile: (801)415-3500 
Attorneys for 51-SPR-LLC 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, L.C., et al., 
Defendants. 
51-SPR-LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, L.C., et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON ELLSWORTH PAULSEN'S 
FAILURE TO OBTAIN A BOND CLAIM 
Civil No. 010405059 
Judge Stott 
Civil No. 020400442 
(Consolidated) 
FILED^^'/-
Fourth Judicial District Coi"1 
of Utah County, State of U' 'i 
\ AH\M^-^ i J •'.,•'••' j 
Ellsworth Paulsen's renewed motion for summary judgment against 51-SPR on 
Ellsworth Paulsen's failure to obtain a bond claim, and 51-SPR's cross-motion for summary 
judgment on the failure to obtain a bond claim came before the Court at oral argument on 
December 3, 2003. Ellsworth Paulsen was represented by Mark L. Poulsen and 51-SPR was 
represented by R. Stephen Marshall and Erik A. Olson. Based on the parties' respective 
memoranda and arguments, the Court concludes that Ellsworth Paulsen, as the general contractor 
in connection with the construction projects at issue, has no right of action under the payment 
bond statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 to -5 . As a result, 51-SPR is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on Ellsworth Paulsen's claim for failing to obtain a payment bond. Based on the 
foregoing, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Ellsworth Paulsen's renewed motion for summary judgment against 51-
SPR on Ellsworth Paulsen's failure to obtain a bond claim is DENIED and 51-SPR's cross-
motion for summary judgment on the failure to obtain a bond claim is GRANTED; 
2. Count Nine of Ellsworth Paulsen's Third Amended Complaint for failure 
to obtain a payment bond is DISMISSED with prejudice and on the merits. 
DATED this / day oPB&kik^200¥ ^ ...
 p? r% 
- * • - < 
- /* 
BY THE COURT: - , :%, 
Fourth District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /fcfi~day of December, 2003,1 caused a copy of the 
foregoing ORDER ON ELLSWORTH PAULSEN'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN A BOND 
CLAIM to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Mark L. Poulsen 
NELSON SNUFFER DAHLE & POULSEN 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
^ikiZM • M K ^ 
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Mark L. Poulsen (5424) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, 
DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
Fax: (801) 576-1960 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and 
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah 
limited liability company; 51-SPR-L.L.C, a 
Utah limited liability company; 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 010405059 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
On December 8, 9, and 10, 2003, this Court conducted a three-day bench trial. 
Arguments were presented to the court concerning various motions submitted by Ellsworth 
Paulsen Construction Company ("Ellsworth Paulsen"), and 51-SPR LLC ("51-SPR"). At the 
trial, the following issues were addressed: (1) the status of certain change orders; (2) abuse of 
lien right under U.C.A. §38-1-25; (3) wrongful lien under U.C.A. §38-9-1; (4) contract damages; 
and (5) attorney's fees. 
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Prior to the trial, both parties submitted memoranda of points and authorities in further 
support of their positions. After considering the arguments presented by the parties at the 
hearing, the Court requested additional briefing on issues related to Ellsworth Paulsen's 
recoverability of the value of extra work and pre-judgment interest calculation. The Court has 
considered all memoranda submitted by the parties, the arguments presented at trial, the relevant 
case law and statutory provisions, and being fully advised in the matter, issues the following 
ruling: 
BACKGROUND 
51-SPR, as a joint venture with Guy Hatch and Broadstone Investments, L.C. 
("Broadstone") entered into an agreement with Ellsworth Paulsen to construct two commercial 
buildings, Northshore Building I and Northshore Building II, on real property located in 
American Fork, Utah. 
Richard Ellsworth has been the sole owner of Ellsworth Paulsen since 1984. Mr. 
Ellsworth has his general contractor's license and is an engineer. Guy Hatch was the apparent 
owner of the project in question. Prior to the commencement of the project in question, Mr. 
Hatch and Ellsworth Paulsen had participated in the construction of a project in American Fork 
that consisted of approximately six buildings. Mr. Hatch acted as the construction manager of 
the American Fork project and also functioned in that capacity for the North Shore project. 
Ellsworth Paulsen contends that the North Shore project was ultimately completed as required 
and monies are due and owing from Broadstone and 51-SPR. 
To finance construction of Building I and Building II, Broadstone obtained construction 
loans for each building from Central Bank. During the course of construction, Ellsworth Paulsen 
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or Broadstone would submit periodic draw requests to Central Bank requesting payments for 
Ellsworth Paulsen and the subcontractors for work performed on the buildings. The 
subcontractors, Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate, prepared and submitted draw requests for 
Ellsworth Paulsen, and Ellsworth Paulsen prepared comprehensive payment requests which were 
submitted to Broadstone. Broadstone then prepared a payment request which was submitted to 
Central Bank and Central Bank prepared checks for payment to Ellsworth Paulsen and the 
subcontractors. Once the draws were approved, joint checks were issued by Central Bank and 
forwarded to Broadstone and Ellsworth Paulsen for disbursement to the respective 
subcontractors. 
Because the subcontractors and Ellsworth Paulsen were not fully paid for the services 
and materials provided to Building I and/or Building II, each recorded mechanic's liens against 
the property in the office of the Utah County recorder. Ellsworth Paulsen also filed a Notice of 
Lien on November 13, 2001 and filed an amended Notice of Lien on November 16, 2001 with 
the Utah County Recorder's Office. Ellsworth Paulsen sent a copy of the Notice of Lien filed on 
November 16, 2001, to the reputed owner of the property, Broadstone Investments, via certified 
mail and to Robert Chimento of 51-SPR via certified mail. Ellsworth Paulsen also filed a timely 
lis pendens. 
Judge Schofield previously determined that 51-SPR and Broadstone were in a joint-
venture and that 51-SPR was liable for the amounts owed Ellsworth Paulsen, if any, by reason of 
its relationship with Broadstone. The parties are well-aware of the historical relationship 
between Broadstone and 51-SPR. This Court finds it unnecessary to further recite information 
with respect to that relationship and the historical information in the litigation that has brought 
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the parties to the time of trial. Rather, this Court focuses specifically on its findings and 
decisions as to issues that were addressed at the time of trial. 
FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
A, Change Orders 
1. The balance due and owing on North Shore Building I is in the amount of 
$199,830.53. The balance due and owing on North Shore Building II is in the amount of 
$364,991.26. These amounts are reflected by information contained in Plaintiffs Exhibits 5 and 
6, respectively. 
2 As to the property referred to as the Williams property, the evidence establishes 
that Guy Hatch contacted Mr. Ellsworth showing to him drawings which proposed the 
development of the Williams property including Buildings I and II on the property in question. 
Mr. Hatch, the primary principal and owner of the property for Buildings I and II, requested that 
Mr. Ellsworth enter into an agreement with him wherein Ellsworth Paulsen paid the sum of 
$110,000 to Vintage Construction for what Mr. Ellsworth assumed was to be for engineering 
design work and other costs for the Williams property and possibly for Building II. 
3. Ellsworth Paulsen gave a check to Vintage Construction for $110,000 which 
included $32,000 for the Broadstone project and $78,000 for the Williams North Shore project. 
The evidence establishes that Mr. Hatch did not inform Mr. Ellsworth how the money was to be 
used and where the funds were to go. Mr. Ellsworth assumed, based on his conversations with 
Mr. Hatch, that the monies would go to those two respective projects. Mr. Hatch instructed Mr. 
Ellsworth that a change order for Building II in the amount of $78,000 could be applied in that 
fashion. 
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4 As the result of a conversation with Mr Hatch, Mr Ellsworth was unsure how the 
$78,000 was to be used but was informed that Hubble Engineering would be involved on the 
project and Mr Hatch further represented that Ellsworth Paulsen would be repaid the $78,000 
5 Mr Ellsworth paid the $78,000 as per the instruction of Mr Hatch, without 
determining where the money was going and how it was going to be applied to the project Mr 
Ellsworth relied upon representations of Mr Hatch, as the owner and construction manager of 
the project, as to how the money would be used with assurances that Broadstone would be 
responsible for the repayment to Ellsworth Paulsen 
6. During the course of the project, Mr Hatch disappeared Ellsworth Paulsen 
attempted to find Mr Hatch, but for a significant period of time was unable to do so As of 
November 2001, Ellsworth Paulsen became aware that 51-SPR was somehow involved in the 
project, but did not know their status or relationship with Mr Hatch Mr Hatch was eventually 
found by representatives of Ellsworth Paulsen to be living in Hawaii A number of change 
orders had been requested by Mr Hatch for the project in question, the work had been done by 
Ellsworth Paulsen, and yet the change orders had not been signed Eventually, Mr Hatch agreed 
to sign all the change orders sent to him in Hawaii for that purpose 
7 The evidence establishes that Mr Hatch would directly contact the subcontractors 
working on the project, in most instances without first communicating with Ellsworth Paulsen, 
and would make requests for changes The work and changes requested by Mr Hatch were 
completed and in many cases Ellsworth Paulsen found out about the changes after the fact 
8 The evidence establishes that all of the requests for change orders by Mr Natch 
were performed by the subcontractors and Ellsworth Paulsen with work being completed as 
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requested and Ellsworth Paulsen ultimately being assured by Mr. Hatch on behalf of Broadstone 
that the subcontractors would be paid for their work. The change orders took place in this 
fashion in both Building I and II. It was not the custom or practice of Ellsworth Paulsen or Mr. 
Hatch/Broadstone, to communicate with the architect for approval of the change orders. In fact, 
the process for requesting change orders and having them approved involved eliminating the 
architect from that procedure both by Ellsworth Paulsen and by Broadstone. 
9. As to the information reflected in Defendants' Exhibit 64 pertaining to Building I, 
all of the work requested in Mr. Hatch's change orders on behalf of Broadstone was completed 
by Ellsworth Paulsen. 
10. Although the evidence establishes that the parties entered into the agreement for 
the development of the project to construct Building I and II using AIA document forms, this 
Court finds that the custom and practice between Ellsworth Paulsen and Broadstone resulted in a 
deviation from the requirement for change orders as contained in the AIA documents. As the 
general custom and practice, and as a result of the relationship between Ellsworth Paulsen and 
Mr. Hatch/Broadstone, all of the change orders were not written and signed off on prior to the 
time work began. The change orders were done at the request of Mr. Hatch without consultation 
by him with the architect, and as established in many instances, without consulting with 
Ellsworth Paulsen. Instead, Mr. Hatch directly communicated and instructed the subcontractors 
to make changes. 
11. By reason of the agreed upon procedure and process for processing change orders, 
Broadstone waived any claim that all the change orders must be signed and the court finds that 
all work requested by Mr. Hatch/Broadstone of the subcontractors and Ellsworth Paulsen was 
completed. 
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12. The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen cannot collect from 51-SPR the $78,000 it 
paid Mr. Hatch/Broadstone. Mr. Hatch's activity and participation with respect to the Williams 
property did not relate to his agreements with Mr. Chimento and 51-SPR for the development of 
the Auto Mall/North Shore project, nor was the Williams property part of the development of the 
two North Shore buildings. 
B. Mr. Wilson 
13. The evidence establishes that Mark Wilson was the architect on the project and Mr. 
Hatch asked him to design Northshore Buildings I and II. Mr. Wilson contracted with 
Broadstone and Mr. Hatch for work he did on the project. The evidence does not indicate that 
Mr. Wilson ever dealt with 51-SPR as to any work he performed on the project. 
14. The evidence establishes that on occasion, Mr. Hatch would meet with Mr. Wilson 
and discuss the status of the project. But Mr. Hatch, on behalf of Broadstone, left Mr. Wilson 
out of the loop in requesting and approving change orders. Mr. Hatch himself contacted the 
subcontractors directly without prior consultation with Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson was eventually 
informed by Mr. Hatch of the change orders that were requested and work that was performed on 
both Buildings of the Northshore project. 
15. Mr. Wilson, based upon his meetings with Mr. Hatch believed that all of the work 
required by Mr. Hatch from Ellsworth Paulsen was performed according to the change order 
request. On rare occasion, the evidence establishes that Ellsworth Paulsen brought change 
orders to Mr. Wilson for his approval and signature. 
C. Mr. Chimento 
16. Mr. Chimento is a real estate developer residing in California. 51-SPR is an entity 
established by Mr. Chimento. Mr. Chimento and his brother met Mr. Hatch in approximately 
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1999 and over a period of time discussed with him the development of what Mr. Chimento 
referred to as the Auto Mall property in American Fork. The testimony of Mr. Chimento 
establishes that as of approximately August 2001, as a result of discussions between Mr. 
Chimento on behalf of 51-SPR and Mr. Hatch, on behalf of Broadstone, that Mr. Hatch 
voluntarily surrendered all of his interest in the project involving Buildings I and II. The 
evidence establishes that at all times during the development and construction of Buildings I and 
II, Mr. Hatch had the authority for an acted on behalf of Mr. Chimento and 51-SPR. 
17. The evidence establishes that Ellsworth Paulsen had no reason to submit the 
change orders for approval by 51-SPR because Ellsworth Paulsen was unaware of 51-SPR's 
interest in the project. 
18. Shortly before the completion of the project, Mr. Ellsworth became aware of Mr. 
Chimento and communication ensued between Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. Chimento. Mr. Ellsworth 
advised Mr. Chimento that Ellsworth Paulsen had not been paid for its work on the project and 
Mr. Chimento assured Mr. Ellsworth that he would look into the matter and determine what 
needed to be done to assure payment to Ellsworth Paulsen and complete construction on the 
project. 
D. Notice of Interest 
19. The evidence establishes that the Notice of Interest, Defendants' Exhibit 22, was 
prepared and filed by Ellsworth-Paulsen on or about April 2, 2001. The Notice of Interest was 
filed because Broadstone was delinquent in its payments to Ellsworth Paulsen. Subsequent to 
the filing of the Notice of Interest and after discussing the same with counsel, Ellsworth Paulsen 
released the Notice of Interest on or about February 28, 2002 as per Plaintiff's Exhibit 26. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATED 
TO THE PARTIES5 CLAIMS 
I. Breach of Contract 
20. This Court has previously determined that, as Broadstone's partner and joint-
venturer, 51-SPR is liable to Ellsworth Paulsen for Broadstone's contract debts. The evidence 
establishes that 51-SPR failed and refused to pay the June, July, and August 2002 draw requests, 
thereby breaching its contract with Ellsworth Paulsen. The court further finds that Ellsworth 
Paulsen completed all of the required work, and there is no evidence to establish that any of the 
work is defective or otherwise has problems. 
21. Therefore, this Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to the amounts set 
forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit 27 less the $78,000 Williams property request. 
II. Abusive Lien 
22. 51-SPR has made a claim pursuant to U.C.A. §38-1-25 for abuse of lien right in 
which it has characterized as a malicious lien claim. This claim pertains to activity associated 
with the Williams property and the recordation of a lien by Ellsworth Paulsen in the amount of 
$78,000. In determining whether 51-SPR is entitled to relief under 38-1-25, the Court adopts the 
findings previously recited herein with respect to the Williams property and the $78,000 paid by 
Ellsworth Paulsen to Mr. Hatch and Broadstone. 
23. Section 38-1-3 of the Utah Code provides the following: 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing 
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration or 
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner . . . shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they 
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or 
equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively . . . 
This Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen believed it was entitled to lien, because the lien was 
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put in place at the instruction of Mr. Hatch in order to ensure reimbursement to Ellsworth 
Paulsen for the $78,000. At the time the $78,000 was paid, and at the time the lien was filed, 
Ellsworth Paulsen did not know how much of the $78,000 was used or applied to the 
construction of Buildings I and II. Ellsworth Paulsen acted in good faith and upon the 
instructions of the owner of the property when placing its lien. 
24. Section 38-1-25 of the Utah Code describes the penalties to be imposed upon 
those parties who commit an abuse of lien right. This Section states: 
(1) Any person entitled to record or file a lien under Section 38-1-3 is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor who intentionally causes a claim of lien against any 
property, which contains a greater demand than the sum due to be recorded or 
filed: 
(a) with the intent to cloud the title; 
(b) to exact from the owner or person liable by means of the excessive 
claim of lien more than is due; or 
(c) to procure any unjustified advantage or benefit. 
(2) In addition to any criminal penalties under Subsection (1), a person who 
violates Subsection (1) is liable to the owner of the property or an original 
contractor or subcontractor who is affected by the lien for the greater of: 
(a) twice the amount by which the wrongful lien exceeds the amount 
actually due; or 
(b) the actual damages incurred by the owner of the property. 
The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen did file a lien against the property in question, 
however, Ellsworth Paulsen did not intend to cloud the title to exact more than it believed was 
due or procure an unjustified advantage. 
25. The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen acted in good faith in claiming the $78,000 
based upon the instruction and direction given by Mr. Natch and Broadstone. The Court finds 
that Ellsworth Paulsen's only intent in filing the lien was to ensure payment of the $78,000 it had 
given to Vintage Construction at the direction of Mr. Hatch, the owner of the property. The 
recording of the lien was done solely at the direction of Mr. Hatch to ensure that Ellsworth 
Paulsen would be reimbursed for the $78,000 it paid. At the time the $78,000 was paid, and at 
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the time the lien was filed, Ellsworth Paulsen as a result of its conversations with Mr. Hatch, did 
not know how much of the $78,000 was used or would be applied to the construction of 
Buildings I and II. This Court finds that the lien was not intended to extract from the owner 
more than was due or procure an unjustified advantage, because the lien was filed for the amount 
to be reimbursed to Ellsworth Paulsen. 
26. Ellsworth Paulsen did not cause the lien to be filed with the intent to cloud the 
property to exact more than it believed was due or procure an unjustified advantage, thus this 
Court finds no violation of U.C.A §38-1-25(1). Since the Court does not find a violation of 
Subsection (1), the penalties in Subsection (2) do not apply. However, Ellsworth Paulsen is not 
entitled to judgment against 51-SPR for such amount. 
III. Wrongful Lien 
27. As to the wrongful lien claim, the evidence establishes that Mr. Ellsworth filed the 
Notice of Interest because Mr. Hatch/Broadstone were delinquent on the payments due Ellsworth 
Paulsen, and someone in his office told him it was a good idea. The Notice remained a matter of 
public record from the time of filing, on April 2, 2001, until it was removed on February 28, 
2002, immediately following Mr. Ellsworth's consultation with counsel. The Court finds that 
the Notice of Interest was not authorized by the owner of the real property, Mr. Hatch, and was 
not a proper document to have been filed by Ellsworth Paulsen. 
28. In order for 51-SPR to claim civil liability for the filing of a wrongful lien against 
Ellsworth Paulsen, 51-SPR must qualify under U.C.A. §38-9-1, as either the record interest 
holder or record owner of the property in question. According to U.C.A. §38-9-1(6): 
"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is 
recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of 
the real property. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1(6) (emphasis added). 
29. The Court finds that there is no evidence of a recorded interest by 51-SPR during 
the time in question. Based on the evidence produced, the Court finds that there was a real estate 
purchase agreement between Broadstone and 51-SPR pertaining to the property in question dated 
June 15, 2000 (See Defendants' Exhibit 56), but there is no evidence of recordation of ownership 
interest in 51-SPR during the time in question. The evidence only establishes an unrecorded real 
estate agreement without any notice to Ellsworth Paulsen of 51-SPR's interest in the North 
Shore project. 
30. The record owner at the time of recording of the wrongful lien was 
Hatch/Broadstone. 51-SPR was not the record owner at the time the Notice of Interest was filed. 
The Notice of Interest was filed and recorded in April 2, 2001. The release was filed on 
February 28, 2002. There has been no evidence presented for the Court to find that 51-SPR was 
the record owner as defined by U.C.A. §38-9-1 at the time of the recording of the document, nor 
has there has been any evidence to establish that a wrongful lien had any negative impact on 51-
SPR's subsequent ownership of the property. 
31. Section 38-9-4 of the Utah Code sets forth the damages and civil liability for filing 
a wrongful lien. The language of the statute provides that: 
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or for treble 
actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs, 
who records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real property, 
knowing or having reason to know that the document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
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(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3). 
The Court finds that the Notice of Interest was an improper document to have been filed by 
Ellsworth Paulsen. 
32. Furthermore, no request was made by Hatch or Broadstone to remove the Notice 
and, under the applicable statute, Ellsworth Paulsen would be liable to the record owner at the 
time of the recording of the document. 51-SPR did provide notice to Ellsworth Paulsen by a 
letter from Mr. Chimento dated November 29, 2001 to remove the Notice of Interest (See 
Defendants' Exhibit 51), and the claim was subsequently removed on February 23, 2002. 
33. There has been no evidence to establish that as of the date of Mr. Chimento's letter 
to Ellsworth Paulsen, that 51-SPR was a "record interest holder" of the real property. The only 
evidence of ownership to the real property presented at the time of trial consisted of the deed of 
trust and promissory notes to Buildings I and II establishing Broadstone as the owner without 
any reference to 51-SPR. 
34. The Notice was released at the direction of Ellsworth Paulsen's counsel and no 
actual damages were proved. Also, no evidence of attorney's fees were proved by 51-SPR in 
connection with the removal of the wrongful lien. This Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen is 
liable to 51-SPR in the amount of $3,000. Any claim for attorney's fees under U.C.A. §38-9-4 is 
denied. 
IV. Retention and Retention Interest 
35. As to the issue of retentions, the evidence produced by Ellsworth Paulsen 
establishes that the claimed retentions for Building I were in the amount of $92,939.39. The 
claimed retentions for Building II were in the amount of $47,142.77. 
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36. The Court finds that the custom and practice of Ellsworth Paulsen was to submit 
requested draws to Central Bank or Broadstone, Central Bank was to make payments based on 
these draws. The retentions represent amounts not actually paid by Central Bank. Ellsworth 
Paulsen's position is that it is entitled to interest on those amounts as retained amounts by 
Central Bank and/or Broadstone. The evidence establishes that such monies were never 
physically accounted for and retained and identified as such by Central Bank or Broadstone. The 
amounts claimed as retained monies do not exist. 
37. As to the calculation of retention interest amounts, the evidence does not support a 
finding that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to its claim for retention interest against 51-SPR. The 
monies claimed by Ellsworth Paulsen for retention were never withheld, never identified as 
retained funds by Central Bank or 51-SPR. 
38. Furthermore, Ellsworth Paulsen's claim against 51-SPR for retention interest is 
denied. U.C.A. §13-8-5(10)(b)(i) requires that Ellsworth Paulsen prove Broadstone and or 51-
SPR knowingly and wrongfully withheld a retention in order to recover. U.C.A. §13-8-5(l)(b) 
states: 
(b)(i) Any owner, public agency, original contractor, or subsequent who 
knowingly and wrongfully withholds a retention shall be subject to a charge of 
2% per month on the improperly withheld amount, in addition to any interest 
otherwise due. 
The Court finds that Broadstone and 51-SPR did not withhold retention proceeds, nor did 
they attempt to do so knowingly or wrongfully. The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen failed to 
present sufficient evidence to support a finding that §13-8-5 requires 51-SPR to be responsible 
for the payment of such monies. 
V. Pre-judgement Interest 
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39. With regard to Ellsworth Paulsen's claim for pre-judgment interest, the Court finds 
that Ellsworth Paulsen cannot recovery its claim for pre-judgment interest against 51-SPR. It is 
undisputed that Ellsworth Paulsen never submitted to anyone its final payment application on 
Building I or the final two applications on Building II. These three applications remain 
unsigned. It is not possible for the Court to set a specific date on which payment of the three un-
submitted applications became due. The court has considered the information submitted by the 
parties subsequent to the time of trial with respect to calculation of pre-judgment interest and the 
court cannot, as Ellsworth Paulsen suggests, simply "pick a date" from which interest begins to 
accrue. 
40. The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen has not been successful in marshaling 
evidence or law to support a claim for pre-judgment interest and the court is unable to fix a date 
as to the time for calculation of that interest. Based on the evidence presented at the time of trial, 
it is clear that a date cannot be sufficiently calculated. Ellsworth Paulsen cannot recover its 
claim for pre-judgment interest on its three un-submitted payment applications. 
41. However, the Court does find that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to pre-judgment 
contractual interest on its breach of contract claim as requested, but denies Ellsworth Paulsen's 
claim for interest on its mechanic's lien foreclosure claim. 
VI. Attorney's Fees 
42. Attorney's fees are generally awarded to the prevailing party. U.C.A §38-1-18(1) 
explains that a Court is allowed to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party: 
(1) Except as provided in Section 18-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action 
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be 
entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court, which 
shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18(1) (emphasis added). 
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43. By reason of the claims made by 51-SPR, this Court must make a determination as 
to which of the parties is the prevailing party entitled to make a claim for attorney's fees. Under 
Pochvnok v. Smedsrud, et. aL 2003 UT App 375, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that the 
trial court was in a better position to determine which party was the prevailing party. 
Considering all of the factors and formulas discussed in Pochvnok, the Court finds from all the 
evidence presented, that Ellsworth Paulsen is the prevailing party in the case and is entitled to 
attorney's fees and costs. The factors the Court relies on to support its findings that Ellsworth 
Paulsen is the prevailing party are as follows: 
A. Ellsworth Paulsen's breach of contract claim is granted. 
B. The work was performed by Ellsworth Paulsen and the subcontractors on 
North Shore Buildings I and II at the direction of the owner, Mr. Hatch 
and Broadstone, both under the terms of the contract and through change 
orders, with full compliance by Ellsworth Paulsen in performing all of the 
work requested by the owner. 
C. Judge Schofield previously found that 51-SPR, by reason of a joint 
venture with Broadstone and Mr. Hatch, stood in the same position as 
Broadstone. 
D. The Court has reviewed all of the evidence produced with respect to the 
amounts claimed regarding the mechanic's lien claim and has evaluated 
those amounts at issue and determined that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to 
its claim on the mechanic's lien claim for amounts less the $78,000 
associated with the Williams property. 
44. Considering the totality of all the evidence, even though a portion of the claimed 
amount was denied to Ellsworth Paulsen, the facts support a finding that Ellsworth Paulsen is the 
prevailing party. Furthermore, in this case, the facts distinguish the application of the Pochvnok 
case; in Pochvnok, there was an offer of judgment submitted which the Court of Appeals relied 
upon to reach its determination as to which party ultimately prevailed in the lawsuit. Here, there 
was never an offer of judgment by 51-SPR or Broadstone. 
VI. Reasonableness of Attorney Fees 
45. After the Court determined that Ellsworth Paulsen was the prevailing party, and as 
such was entitled reasonable to attorneys fees, Ellsworth Paulsen's counsel submitted an 
affidavit setting forth what it suggests are the reasonable attorney fees in this case. As required 
by the case of A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction, 977 P.2d 518 
(Utah App. 1999), Ellsworth Paulsen has allocated in its affidavit those attorney fees which are 
recoverable under the lien statute, from those fees which were incurred pursuing legal claims and 
theories for which it would not be entitled to a fee award. As set forth in the affidavit of counsel, 
Ellsworth Paulsen, is claiming that it is entitled to $164,993.60 for fees which are related directly 
or indirectly to its mechanic's lien claim. The Court has reviewed the affidavit using the factors 
set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Broken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988). These factors are: 1) 
Was the legal work actually performed ? 2) How much of the work was reasonably necessary to 
prosecute and defend the matter? 3) Was the attorney's billing rate reasonable in light of the 
locality and type of services rendered? 4) Are there other factors requiring special 
consideration? 
46. As to the first factor, the court finds that the attorney fees presented by Ellsworth 
Paulsen represent fees for work actually performed. The fees requested are not disproportionate 
to the amounts claimed or recovered. This is particularly so considering the amounts which were 
originally claimed by Ellsworth Paulsen, before several of the subcontractors were eliminated 
from the case through settlement. The court has reviewed the entries for the work claimed, and 
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recognizes that most of such work related to work being presented in one form or another in 
open court. In this case, many of the issues presented in the form of motions and trial work 
evidence were inextricably tied to the mechanic's lien claims. This includes the entries for such 
issues as the lien waivers, the timeliness of the liens, the writ of attachment, the legal work 
related to the alternate security, and like matters. The court finds also that the amounts claimed 
by Ellsworth Paulsen as allocated to the claims for which it can recover is reasonable in the 
amount of $164,993.60, and that the work reflected for those fees was actually performed. 
47. As to the second issue of what legal work was reasonablely necessary to prosecute 
the case, the evidence supports the reasonableness of the fees as to this factor. This action was 
complex from the beginning, with at least twelve different parties involved. The record shows 
that there were approximately 21 depositions taken, and approximately 90 motions filed. 51-
SPR asserted numerous counter-claims, which could have defeated recovery under the lien, but 
which were defeated by Ellsworth Paulsen, primarily through motions. 51-SPR has filed an 
affidavit in support of its default judgment against Broadstone and Hatch claiming fees in this 
case, and a much smaller related case, of $427,249. As such, the evidence supports Ellsworth 
Paulsen's contention that $164,993.60 is an appropriate and reasonable fee under the 
circumstances. 
48. The Court also finds that the hourly rates charged by Mr. Poulsen and Mr. Reich, 
the attorney fees for Ellsworth Paulsen, are billing rates which are customarily charged by 
attorney's of their experience. Mr. Poulsen's rate through all but the last two months of this case 
was $170 per hour, and Mr. Reich's rate was $140 per hour. These rates are customary and usual 
for this type of legal work in Utah and Salt Lake Counties. 
49. Finally, as to any special factors which support the award of fees in this case, the 
court reiterates those points referred to above when it found that Ellsworth Paulsen was the 
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prevailing party in this case. Those factors included the fact that 51-SPR breached the contract 
by failing to pay contract balances, and that all of the work, including the extra work, was 
properly and timely performed and contained no defects. Accordingly, as Broadstone's joint 
venture partner, the work should have been paid for by 51-SPR. 
VIL COSTS. 
50. Ellsworth Paulsen has submitted a verified memorandum of costs in which it seeks 
reimbursement for its costs in the amount of $7,467.73. The claimed costs consist of expenses 
for filing the action, services of process, witness fees, deposition transcripts, and certain limited 
duplication and blow-up charges for trial exhibits. The court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen is only 
entitled to get the costs of depositions on those persons who actually testified at trial. Ellsworth 
Paulsen has claimed costs for two deponants who did not testify at trial. Those persons were 
Kyle Spencer whose deposition costs were $162, and Angela Solberg who deposition costs were 
$477.60 These sums are reduced out of Ellsworth Paulsen's claim for costs, leaving net costs 
allowed to Ellsworth Paulsen for costs of $6,828.13. 
ORDER 
Based upon the forgoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to a judgment in this matter on its breach of contract 
claims and mechanic's lien claims in the principle amount of $199,830.53 on Northshore 
Building I. Ellsworth Paulsen is also awarded judgment for $364,991.26 on Northshore 
Building II, minus $78,000 for the change order representing amounts paid for work on the 
Williams property, and $3,000 for filing the Notice of Interest. This leaves a net judgment of 
$483,821.79 ($364,991.26 + $199,830.53 = $564,821.79 minus $78,000 and minus $3,000 = Net 
Judgment $483,821.79). 
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2. Ellsworth Paulsen is further entitled to contractual interest of $57,863.94 in 
accordance with the attached Schedule "A. This interest rate should be augmented by the 
interest which has accrued since December 22, 2003, (the day that Schedule "A" was prepared) 
through the date of this order, which sum is $7,768.47, for a total pre-judgment amount of 
$65,632.41. 
3. Ellsworth Paulsen is also entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party in this 
case. The reasonable attorneys fees awarded to Ellsworth Paulsen is $164,933.60 through 
February 17th, 2004, to be taxed as costs as required by Utah Code. Ann. §38-18-1(1). 
4. Finally, Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to $6,828.13 to be taxed as costs. 
In summary, Ellsworth Paulsen is awarded a judgment in the total amount, including 
principle, interest, attorney fees and costs of $721,215.93 Based upon the 10% per annum 
interest rate set forth in the parties' contract, this judgment shall continue to bear interest post-
judgment at 10% per annum, and any judgment rendered herein may be augmented by Ellsworth 
Paulsen's reasonable attorney fees through collection. The total judgment rendered in this case 
may be enforced against the Alternate Security Bond on file with the Court in which Capitol 
Indemnity Corporation is the surety. 
Dated this / / d a y of ^ ^ 3 0 0 4 . 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Erik Olsen 
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SUMMARY OF INTEREST DUE ON ELLSWORTH PAULSEN'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS 
Pay Request # 
Building 1 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
8 
9 
Building II 
2 
3 
7 
7 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
9 
10 
Date 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
4/16/2001 
none 
12/15/2000 
1/11/2001 
5/31/2001 
5/31/2001 
7/17/2001 
7/17/2001 
7/17/2001 
7/17/2001 
7/17/2001 
none 
none 
Due Date 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
5/16/2001 
none 
1/14/2001 
2/10/2001 
6/30/2001 
6/30/2001 
8/16/2001 
8/16/2001 
8/16/2001 
8/16/2001 
8/16/2001 
none 
none 
Date Paid 
4/16/2001 
5/7/2001 
6/27/2001 
7/5/2001 
7/18/2001 
7/26/2001 
7/31/2001 
8/10/2001 
12/31/2002 
10/14/2003 
12/10/2003 
not paid 
not paid 
not paid 
2/2/2001 
2/21/2001 
7/31/2001 
10/15/2003 
12/31/2002 
10/15/2003 
10/15/2003 
12/10/2003 
not paid 
not paid 
not paid 
Invoice Amount 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
47,429.87 
27,938.67 
8,000.00 
26,974.91 
10,343.70 
34,260.58 
3,961.18 
11,139.70 
800.80 
2,089.02 
16,133.59 
36,457.43 
87,138.17 
76,234.93 
345,284.19 
260,050.42 
7,342.50 
1,710.86 
10,601.00 
119,425.00 
32,978.00 
59,559.41 
83,146.18 
197,079.64 
78,465.15 
Days Late 
11 
32 
83 
91 
104 
112 
117 
127 
635 
922 
979 
991 
950 
0 
19 
11 
31 
837 
502 
790 
790 
846 
858 
0 
0 
Interest Rate 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
TOTAL 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10 0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
10.0% 
TOTAL 
Interest Due 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
142.94 
244.94 
181.92 
672.53 
294.72 
1,051.28 
126.97 
387.60 
-
-
-
9,898.44 
22,679.80 
-
35,681.15 
1,797.37 
783.71 
62.36 
-
-
-
-
-
19,539.35 
-
-
22,182.79 
Hansen settlement 
Westwood settlement 
Halverson settlement 
never submitted 
Allstate settlement 
Hansen settlement 
Allstate settlement 
Westwood settlement 
Halverson settlement 
never submitted 
never submitted 
GRAND TOTAL FOR BOTH BUILDINGS $ 57,863.94 
Tab J 
Mark L. Poulsen (5424) 
NELSON. SNUFFER, 
DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
Fax:(801)576-1960 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY dba 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and 
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a 
Utah limited liability company; 51-SPR-
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company; 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 010405059 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
On February 3, 2004, the Court made a ruling in which it determined that Plaintiff 
Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Services ("Ellsworth Paulsen") had prevailed in the action with 
Defendant 51 -SPR, LLC. Subsequently, on the lb day of _
 tyUdq , 2004, 
the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in which it found for Ellsworth 
Paulsen, granting an award of principal, interest and attorney fees. 
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Ellsworth Paulsen be awarded Judgment against said 
Defendant 51-SPR, LLC in the amount of: 
$483,821.79 
$ 164,933.60 
$ 65,632.41 
$ 6.828.13 
$721,215.93 
Principal. 
Attorney fees through February 8th, 2004. 
Accrued interest through February 3, 2004. 
Accrued costs through February 3, 2004. 
TOTAL JUDGMENT 
This judgment shall bear interest on the total Judgment at Ten Percent (10%) per annum 
in accordance with the contract between the parties through the date of payment, plus 
after-accruing costs. 
This judgment is enforceable against Capitol Indemnity Corporation, the Surety which 
provided an alternate security bond, the original of which is lodged with the Court, securing the 
amounts for which judgment herein is given. 
Dated this jfo of ^Mf}(i , 2004. 
V BY THE COURT: 
M ^ T , 
/ >•„ 
Gary D. Scott d is t r ic t Court Judge ^S^VQ^MAZ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served, via U.S. Postage, prepaid, facsimile, or hand-
delivery, a true and correct copy of the foregoing. JUDGEMENT on the following: 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Erik Olsen 
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for defendant 51-SPR, L.L.C. 
Sent via: 
>C Mail 
Facsimile 
_ j r _ Hand-delivery 
DATED this / / day of May, 2004 
O ^ U '-4* 
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THIS ADDENDUM # 2 TO REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT BETWEEN 
BROAOSTONE INVESTMENTS, LLC AND 51 SOUTH PORTLAND REALTY CORP. DATED 
JUNE IS, 2000 
RE; Auto Mall Development 
The terms and conditions of this Addendum #2 are hereby incorporated in the above 
Real Estate Purchase Contract as If set forth at length therein. 
This memorandum shall summahre the terms of th* agreements reached regarding the 
above development project and set forth the same in contractual form, Intending to bind the 
parties with regard thereto, as dosing of title on the real estate te needed by 6/15/00; 
thereafter more detailed agreements In appropriate form wiM b« prepared and executed 
reflecting the following terms: 
- Utah tide company as nominee for 51 South Portland Realty, 
corporation (Chimento), and 
a New York 
, a Utah LLC CUtah LLC) (Guy Hatch and , his 
partner will own this, see below as to restrictions;) will acquire tWe as ten?nts«ln*common (with 
a 50% interest k) each) to the entire 6,58 acre parcel from Ford investment Enterprises 
Corpc ation for the purchase prtrr of $1,750,000.00 (the *und"), 
- Chimento will contribute as capital to the projact the sum of $2,900,000.00 to be 
transferred to and held by Utah Title Company as a Qualified Intermediary (*QO and applied 
as follows: 
$1,750,000 • 
5,000(7) -
87,000 -
545,000 • 
•MMXHK?) 
to purchase 
To costs of purchase 
Commission to ReMax 
To site Improvement costs 
To building construction costs (see following) 
Total i %900,000 
- Utah LLC shaJ be the project manager In charge of obtaining remaining needed 
construction financing and Institutional permanent financing for Buildings I and 11 (hereinafter 
"office buildings"), construction supervision, leasing of the buildings, sate of the station/store 
site, and operation of the venture. Utah LLC wttt recent a fee of $135,000.00 for such services, 
payable In three installments of $45,000.00 on Jury 15, 2000, September 1, 2000 and October 
15, 2000. 
- Utah LLC wHI provide financing for needed construction monies for the office building 
end remaining cash needs of the project. Guy Hatch will guaranty such financing. 
- Chimento will execute mortgage as to its tenancy «n common interest to secure 
institutional construction financing but wiH not be obligated on any Note or by way of guarantee 
at any time 
• Chimento funds for site development and construction costs "hard" costs only not 
"soft" costs except the Utah LLC fees or interest) will be utilized prior to any other construction 
e\*r cocuMBWJWMfu >r KB»V«»»M<M»C <%\ 
IIP 
51-SPR 00190 
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financing, on a standard draw schedule with 10% retainage (Inclusive), to be released by QI 
after Inspection approval by a Chimento engineer to be retained by CWmento and paid as a 
project cost 
• Utah LLC shett be a single member, single purpose LLC satisfactory to NJ counsel for 
CWmento whose ownership interest and control shall be pledged to Chimento to secure Utah 
LLC's and Hatch's obligations, with a restriction agreement In recordable form satisfactory to M 
counsel In favor of Chimento es to the UC and the LLC's tenancy m common Interest in the 
land. 
- Utah LLC shall mortgage its tenancy in common interest in the land to Chimento to 
secure the pledge and restriction agreements 4$ well Hatch's obligations pursuant to this 
memo, Chimento shall subordinate Its mortgage only with respect to Institutional construction 
financing, chimento win release this mortgage will be released upon completion of the project 
and closing of permanent Institutional financing. 
Note: Chlmento's acquisition of its interest In the project is through a "Uke-KfexT exchange and 
where the term Chimento Is usedr QI shall act as Chlmento's nominee until Chimento may take 
title pursuant to IRS regulations, 
The parties intend that following completton of the project and at the time of permanent 
financing but not earlier than 1/1/2001, as they miy hereafter agree, Chimento and Utah LLC 
may transfer their Interests to a new Utah LLC to be owned equally by them, otherwise 
consistent with the terms of this memo, but in any event the project shaH be held for 
investment and all actions by the parties shall be In furtherance of that goal. (New Utah UC 
documents to be satisfactory to M counsel for Chimento). 
• The development project shall be on a cash basis with a calendar year end. 
- Chimento shall receive a 10% return on Ks capita! commencing December 1, 2000 
through the end of the first year following dosing on the land, to be paid monthly commencing 
on 1/1/2001. Hatch shall guaranty such return, to be paid from operating income of the project 
if sufficient, end if not, then frgm proceeds of s&e of a portion of the land - the 
station/convenience matt, If any, Utah LLC shall contribute any and all sums to the project 
needed for payment of such return. 
- Any net operating income remaining m the first year, to Hatch. 
• Chimento shaH have tr>e option to receive a 10% return on its capital for a second year 
on terms set forth above for year l, or to share 50/50 in net operating income of the project for 
the year following dosing on the Land. 
- Thereafter Chimento and Utah, LLC shall share 50/50 in net operating income of the 
project. 
- Permanent financing w ••< "take out" all financed construction costs (including soft costs 
and leasing costs) (No brokerage »s to be paid to Hatch or affiliated entities) and the project or 
buildings individual w* secure the same if financed as to the whole or individually. The parties 
agree to consult as to the amount of permanent financing which may exceed the above and, if 
C:v%TV DOCW$HT*wr3 »Vf U W Hl**\Mf HO &PC 2 
p . 3 
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agreed, such excess to be applied as follows: to Chimento to reimburse in the fbllowlng order 
as available, (I) land dosing costs; (ii) allocated construction costs, i,e, building l and bgilding 
2; (iii) allocated site improvement costs, i.e., building J and building 2; and (iv) allocated land 
costs, I.e. building 1 and 2; and after Chimento capital repaid In full, to each 50/50. 
• Subsequent capital transactions (refinances, sales, casualty or condemnation) after 
debt repayment to (0 remaining unpaid Chimento capital; and thereafter (ii) to each 50/50. 
Distributions of net operating Income after completion of construction, to be made not less than 
quarterly. 
Distribution from capital transactions no later than 20 days after receipt. 
All decisions regarding the project shall be mutually made #fter consultation. 
Monthly construction and leasing reports to be submitted by Hatch* 
Quarterly statements to be submitted within 30 days of close of quarter. 
Year end statements to be submitted within 45 days of dose of year. 
Tax ret.ns to be prepared, and delivered to tenants-in-common within 75 days of close of 
yt^ai. 
Such returns shall reflect th«it the property is held as tenants-ln<ommon interests and not as a 
partnership, All such elections sh$» be mad* to be consistent with this. 
Hatch's development entity (not Utah LLC) shall enter Into a consulting agreement with 
CNmentos, individually, with regard to property development Indusive of the project, to a term 
running through March I, 2001, for a fee of $24,000,00 per month payable montHy 
commencing July 1, 2000 (except the Xily 1, 200Q payment shall be $12,00000). 
The provisions of this Addendum shaH survive closing of title* 
SI SOUTH PORTLAND RfALTY CORP. 
©004 
BROAOSTONE INVESTMENTS, LLC 
V/ t 
C:<WY &VCVM*NV3i«T* \\nrtf *tt***rf0.tKX-
51-SPR 00192 
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In consideration of payment of this check payee bv negotiating this check waives 
releases, and relinquishes ail right of lien or claims payee may ha\e up to the date 
of the draw request described <m the reverse side hereof (the "Draw Date") upon the 
property described on the rexcrse side hereof (the "Property**) The payee certifies 
that this check is payment for labor and materials dial were actually performed upon 
and furnished to the Property Payee warrants and guarantees under penalty of fraud 
dial payment in full has been made by payee to the suppliers of all labor and 
materials to the Property incurred up to die Draw Date at the insistence of payee 
Payee agrees to indemnify and hold harmless die owner of die Property and Central 
Bank or its assigns, from any loss, claims, or expenses incurred by diem by reason 
of or rising out of any liens or claims made against die Property by any supplier of 
labor of material at the insistence of payee This instrument shall not be 
negotiable If any of the above language has been stricken or modified by the 
payee or endorsee - ^ 
rOHALBANK 
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